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The Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) is a tool for assessing the risks for media pluralism in a 
given country. The Monitor aims to help policymakers, researchers, and civil society to 
understand the threat to media pluralism in different media systems through research, analysis 
and the provision of country data. 
The present Monitor has been developed and tested by the Centre for Media Pluralism and 
Media Freedom (CMPF), at the European University Institute, and has been funded by the 
European Union. The CMPF created the prototype of the Monitor and pilot-tested it in 2014 
(MPM2014),1 building on the 2009 Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the 
Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach.2 The results of this second prototype, which 
was tested in 2015 (MPM2015), are published in this report. During these two rounds of 
implementation, the CMPF has strengthened the research design of the Monitor, co-ordinated 
the data collection carried out by national experts, and analysed the results, i.e., it has assessed 
the risks for media pluralism across EU Member States.  
This report presents the results and the methodology of the MPM2015 implementation, 
which measures risks to Media Pluralism in 19 EU countries, namely, Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The Monitor 
assesses the risks for media pluralism based on a set of indicators that cover four different 
domains: Basic Protection, Market Plurality, Political Independence and Social Inclusiveness. 
The MPM uses thresholds to determine the value of indicators according to three categories 
of risk – low, medium or high. The indicators cover legal, economic and socio-political questions 
that are assessed by national experts. This means that the MPM2015 tool evaluates the potential 
threats to media pluralism, taking into account both the legal framework and the effective 
situation (practice) of a given media landscape. It is important to stress that the existence of a 
risk for a specific indicator or domain does not necessarily represent an actual deficit of pluralism 
in a given context. 
The first MPM domain, ‘Basic Protection’, represents the regulatory backbone of the media 
sector in every contemporary democracy. Its indicators measure a number of potential areas of 
risk, including the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of regulatory safeguards for 
freedom of expression and the right to information; the status of journalists in each country, 
including their protection and ability to work; as well as the independence and effectiveness of 
the national regulatory bodies, namely, media authorities, competition authorities and electronic 
communications’ authorities. 






Figure i. Overview of the Risk Levels in the Area of ‘Basic Protection’ 
The comparative analysis of risks for ‘Basic Protection’ shows that all of the countries score 
low risk, with the exception of one (Romania). However, several countries come close to the 
medium risk threshold, with a risk level of 25% or more, including Austria, Croatia, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia and Spain. The fact that the risk is generally 
low in the countries that are measured is not surprising, and it is in line with the findings of other 
similar studies in the area, which, in general, do not find high levels of risk for basic freedoms of 
expression and information in the 19 EU countries that are measured by the 2015 Media 
Pluralism Monitor. Despite the overall low level of risk in ‘Basic Protection’, several countries 
showed medium and high levels of risk in specific indicators, so significant concerns remain for 
media freedom and pluralism, as measured by some of the ‘Basic Protection’ indicators. 
Specifically, key areas of risk that were detected by the Media Pluralism Monitor in 2015, in the 
‘Basic Protection’ domain, include the protection of journalists, the criminalisation of 
defamation, and the lack of freedom of information laws in a number of countries. Hence, the 
analysis reveals that although generally at low risk, most of the countries assessed present some 
degree of problems in the domain of basic protection, which, in turn, endangers media freedom 
and media pluralism in other significant areas. 
It should be noted that the indicator on the independence of media authority(ies) has been 
found to be problematic in the 2015 implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor. This 
indicator, which aimed to combine the risks to the independence and effectiveness of media 
authorities, competition authorities and communication authorities, was found to produce 
unreliable findings. In particular, despite significant problems with regard to the independence 
and effectiveness of some of the authorities in many of the countries, the indicator failed to pick 
up on such risks and it tended to produce an overall low level of risk for all countries. This 




Figure ii. Overview of the Risk Levels by Indicator in the Domain of ‘Basic Protection’ 
‘Market Plurality’ indicators deal mostly with media ownership, an economic component 
that is widely considered essential in the assessment of a level of media pluralism in any given 
context. The MPM considers threats to media pluralism that arise from the level of transparency 
and from the level of the concentration of media ownership. 
‘Market Plurality’ indicators show the highest levels of risks amongst all the four domains of 
risk that were captured by the MPM2015, with five countries scoring high risk (Luxembourg, 
Finland, Poland, Spain and Lithuania), nine countries scoring a medium risk (Romania, the 
Czech Republic, Latvia, Portugal, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Austria), and five a 
low risk (Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Malta). 
Figure iii. Overview of the Risk Levels in the Domain of ‘Market Plurality’ 
The results for this set of indicators confirm the trend, shown in the analysis of MPM2014, 
which revealed a medium/high risk in what was then called the ‘Ownership’ domain throughout 
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the nine countries3 that were observed (CMPF 2015). The overall results of the market plurality 
assessment highlight that ownership-related risks are a constant element in the assessments of all 
the considered countries, with some remarkable exceptions. It is very interesting to note that 
within the 2015 analysis, the countries that score low risk in this domain are small countries 
which, generally, have a low GDP. This finding highlights the fact that the widespread 
presumption that market plurality is quite “naturally” at risk in small markets should be 
rethought. 
 
Figure iv. Overview of the Risk Levels by Indicator in the Domain of ‘Market Plurality’ 
The ‘Political Independence’ domain of risk is assessed using indicators that are associated 
with the politicisation of the media, public service media, commercial media outlets, media 
distribution networks, and news agencies.  
The comparative analysis of the risks for ‘Political Independence’ reveals that most of the 
examined countries score a medium risk, with seven being at low risk from political influence 
over their media systems (Sweden, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, the Netherlands, Finland, 
and Latvia). 
Figure v. Overview of the Risk Levels in the Domain of ‘Political Independence’ 
According to the MPM2015 results the strongest point in the system, that is, the least 
susceptible to political pressures, are related to the media distribution networks. In other words, 
                                                     
3 The nine countries observed in 2014 were: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy 
and the UK. 
Executive Summary 
ix 
the smallest risks for political independence across the EU Member States have been found in 
regard to the politicisation of media distribution networks. On the other hand, the two 
mechanisms for exerting political pressure, which seem to be most problematic in some EU 
Member States, are the political affiliations of commercial media and state advertising. These two 
indicators have the greatest number of high risk countries associated with them, i.e., seven EU 
member states reveal a high risk from state advertising, and four from the politicisation of 
control over media outlets.  
However, caution is needed when interpreting this information, since these are also the two 
indicators in which many countries reported missing data. In some cases, the high risk actually 
indicates that the data needed to establish the risk is not available – and this may only be a 
transparency issue, which is a risk in its own right, or an actual risk that is related to the political 
affiliations of the commercial media and the state advertising dependencies.  
 
Figure vi. Overview of the Risk Levels by Indicator in the Domain of ‘Political Independence’ 
‘Social Inclusiveness’ indicators focus on access to airtime and media platforms for 
different cultural and social groups, for local/regional communities, and for people with 
disabilities. They assess both the regulatory safeguards for, and the actual access to, media by 
various groups. The indicators also consider the extent of the centralisation of media systems; 
the universal access to PSM and the Internet; and the quality of the countries’ media literacy 
policies, as well as the level of the digital media skills of the population.  
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The comparative analysis of risks for ‘Social Inclusiveness’ shows that no country scores a 
high risk for the overall domain, while most countries (14 of 19) score a medium risk, and only 
five score a low risk (Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria).  
 
Figure vii. Overview of the Risk Levels in the Domain of ‘Social Inclusiveness’ 
The indicator where the largest number of countries shows a high risk (eight of 19) is that 
related to media literacy. This indicator measures the availability and quality of the media literacy 
policy, the extent of Internet use, and the basic digital skills of the population. In particular, the 
implementation of the MPM2015 has revealed that most of the 19 countries analysed have no, or 
have an underdeveloped, media literacy policy.  
The indicator where most countries show a low risk (15 of 19) is the one on access to media 
by people with physical challenges. In particular, the MPM analysis reveals that the majority of 
the countries have an effective state policy on access to media content by people with physical 
challenges.  
Looking at the domain of ‘Social Inclusiveness’ from the perspective of the 19 Member 
States, the only country that scores a low risk across all the indicators is Sweden. The other 
countries that, on average, display a low risk across the area (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, 






Figure viii. Overview of the Risk Levels by Indicator in the Domain of ‘Social Inclusiveness’ 
The results of the MPM2015 implementation, jointly analysed with the results of the 
MPM2014 pilot, show the extent and complexity of measuring threats to media pluralism in the 
EU Member States. More importantly, the findings have highlighted that no EU country is 






Media freedom and media pluralism are pillars of any democratic society and deserve to be 
safeguarded and protected for the sake of the existence of democracy itself. This is of utmost 
importance, particularly in the present difficult times, when freedom of expression is both 
enhanced and challenged by technological developments and also faces the alarming threats that 
arise from intolerance and fundamentalism. 
At the European Union (EU) level, freedom of expression and the freedom and pluralism of the 
media are principles that are enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.1 The protection and promotion of pluralism and the freedom of the media are crucial 
ingredients in guaranteeing a democratic environment for all EU citizens, and for the legitimacy of 
the Union as a whole. 
Given the growing importance of media freedom and media pluralism, in September, 2013, the 
European Union assigned to the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) at the 
European University Institute, a grant to update, simplify and conduct a pilot-test implementation of 
the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), which was conceived in 2009 by a consortium that was led by 
the University of Leuven.2 The first version of the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) was a tool that 
aimed to measure risks for media pluralism in given countries. It was made up of a large number of 
indicators, and it proved to be difficult to implement. In 2013/2014 the CMPF did an intense and 
challenging simplification process, reducing the number of indicators to those affecting “news and 
current affairs”, and it pilot-tested a prototype version of the tool (MPM2014) on a sample of nine 
EU countries, namely, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the 
UK (CMPF 2015).  
In its 2013 Conclusions on Freedom and Media Pluralism in the Digital Environment (EU 
Council 2013), the European Council stressed the importance of guaranteeing media freedom 
and pluralism through diverse initiatives. In particular, it invited the European Commission to 
‘continue to support the independent monitoring tool for assessing risks to media pluralism in 
the EU (Media Pluralism Monitor), which is implemented by the European University Institute 
of Florence, and encourage its further use by Member States and all relevant stakeholders’ (ibid.). 
Following the first pilot-test implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor, the CMPF 
developed the second prototype of the MPM in 2015. Consequently, the CMPF has fine-tuned 
the first prototype (MPM2014), strengthened the project’s research design, implemented the new 
prototype (MPM2015), and has tested it in the remaining 19 EU Member States (Austria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden).  
The research design was based on a questionnaire that was compiled by national country 
teams that were made up of experts in media pluralism and media freedom, while a second 
group of experts, including national stakeholders and experts in the area, conducted a review of 
                                                     




the answers that required a qualitative type of measurement and/or that lacked measurable and 
easily verifiable data.  
In order to ensure the comparability of the answers and the consistency of their quality, the 
CMPF centrally monitored the data collection and raised questions in cases where there were 
inconsistent or incomplete answers provided by the country teams. This proved to be essential in 
a cross-national study of this size and type. 
The MPM 2015 assessed the risks for media pluralism by considering four domains of risk:  
 Basic Protection  
 Market Plurality 
 Political Independence  
 Social Inclusiveness 
and by taking into account 19 indicators: 
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Figure 1. Overview of Domains and Indicators 
The results of the implementation of the MPM 2015 should be considered to be provisional, 
given that they are based on a prototype, rather than on the final version of the tool. However, 
the results at hand do allow for the tentative mapping of the state of play in relation to the risks 
for media pluralism across EU Member States, and they point to the fact that no EU Member 
State is free from risks. 
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This policy report analyses the results of the 2015 implementation from a comparative 
perspective, and it describes in detail the methodology used for the pilot-test implementation of 
the MPM. The risks for media pluralism are examined, taking into account a number of 
indicators that address different aspects and potential threats to media pluralism in a systematic 
way. The inventory of indicators follows a holistic approach to media pluralism, and gives a 
comprehensive picture of a very complex and multifaceted phenomenon. The four domains 
capture the main areas of risk for media pluralism and media freedom. The ‘Basic Protection’ 
domain consists of four indicators; Market Plurality has three, while Political Independence and 
Social Inclusiveness each have six indicators. Each indicator is the result of an articulated 








This section analyses the results of the 2015 implementation from a comparative perspective. 
The risks for media pluralism are examined, taking into account a number of indicators that 
address different aspects and potential threats to media pluralism in a systematic way, being 
related to four comprehensive main thematic domains: Basic Protection, Market Plurality, 
Political Independence and Social Inclusiveness. The inventory of indicators follows a holistic 
approach to the phenomenon of media pluralism, and it guarantees sufficient complexity and 
comprehensiveness to examine what is a rather complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Each 
indicator is the result of an articulated construction of sub-indicators and elementary variables. 
1.1. Analysis of Basic Protection 
The ‘Basic Protection’ indicators represent the regulatory backbone of the media sector in 
every contemporary democracy, and they measure a number of potential areas of risk, including 
the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of regulatory safeguards for the freedom 
of expression and the right to information; the status of journalists in each country, including 
their protection and their ability to work; as well as the independence and effectiveness of 
national regulatory bodies, namely, media authorities, competition authorities and 
communications authorities. 
Specifically, there are four indicators for ‘Basic Protection’: 
● Protection of freedom of expression 
● Protection of right to information 
● Journalistic profession, standards and protection 
● Independence and effectiveness of national media authorities 
By measuring these aspects of media freedom and media pluralism, the domain of ‘basic 
protection’ gauges the risk to democratic debate in a given country. It therefore lies at the 
foundation of any media system and is thus an essential building block for the media pluralism 
monitor as a whole. Any level of risk in basic protection can be of concern to other areas of 
media freedom and media pluralism, as the protection of these core aspects of media protection 
may be indispensable to all of the other domains that are measured by the monitor. By way of 
example, if freedom of expression, or the right to information, are at risk in a given country, this 
will have severe consequences for the media system as a whole. Similarly, if journalists are unable 
to carry out their work without fear of intimidation or of economic instability, the quality and 
reliability of the entire media landscape will suffer. Finally, the independence and effectiveness of 
media authorities is essential, as it may influence all other areas of media protection, including 
market plurality, political independence and social inclusiveness. 
The indicators of the basic domain present different types of risks, combining both legal and 
socio-economic variables. In particular, the indicators aim to capture dual types of risks in 
relation to specific legal standards, by measuring both the existence of legislation in a given area 
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and its implementation. Starting from the inclusion of a given standard in national laws, the 
monitor assessment often includes an evaluation of the quality of such laws, which is followed by 
an evaluation of their implementation and their effectiveness more broadly. 
The comparative analysis of risks for Basic Protection shows that all countries score a low risk, 
with the exception of one (Romania). However, several countries come close to the medium risk 
threshold, with a risk level of 25% or more, including Austria, Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia and Spain, as shown in Figure 2.  
The fact that the risk is generally low in the countries measured is not surprising, and this is in 
line with the findings of other similar studies in the area, which generally do not find high levels 
of risk for the basic freedoms of expression and information in the countries measured by the 
2015 Media Pluralism Monitor.1 Although the overall level of risk is low in the domain of ‘Basic 
Protection’, concerns remain, as the indicators measure the basic safeguards for media freedom 
and democratic societies, any risk to Basic Protection should be considered problematic for 
media freedom and for pluralism more widely. 
Despite the overall low level of risk in ‘Basic Protection’, concerns therefore remain for media 
freedom and pluralism, as measured by the ‘Basic Protection’ indicators. Several countries 
showed medium and high levels of risk in relation to specific indicators, as described below. 
Romania showed an overall level of medium risk in the ‘Basic Protection’ domain, owing mostly 
to the serious problems relating to the status of journalists in that country. Overall, the pilot 
implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor in 2015 was found to pick up on key areas of 
risk in the domain of ‘Basic Protection’, including the protection of journalists, the 
criminalisation of defamation, and the lack of freedom of information laws in a number of 
countries. The picture reveals that, although generally at low risk, most of the countries assessed 
present some types of problems in the domain of ‘basic protection’, which, in turn, endangers 
media freedom and media pluralism in other significant areas. 
 
 
                                                     





 Figure 2. Basic Protection Domain – Risks per Country2 
 
Protection of freedom of expression 
The first risk assessed in the domain of ‘basic protection’ is the protection of freedom of 
expression. Not only do freedom of opinion and expression “constitute essential foundations for 
democracy, rule of law, peace, stability, sustainable inclusive development and participation in 
public affairs” (EU Council 2014), they also lie at the heart of any healthy media system. The 
indicator on the freedom of expression aims to assess the existence and the effective 
implementation of regulatory safeguards for freedom of expression, as well as the ratification of 
the relevant international instruments. It also looks at whether restrictions upon freedom of 
expression are clearly and narrowly defined in law and in accordance with international and 
regional human rights standards, with a special focus on the area of defamation, given its 
centrality to the work of journalists. Finally, the indicator looks at whether there are instances of 
infringements of the freedom of expression in a country, both off- and online. 
 
 
                                                     
2 Please note that the type of visualisations of results varies, i.e., for some areas or indicators it was more adequate 




Figure 3. Protection of Freedom of Expression Indicator – Risks per Country 
The overall results for the first indicator on the protection of freedom of expression show five 
countries to be at medium risk, namely, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, while 
two countries (Ireland and Spain) are on the border between low risk and medium risk. 
Freedom of expression is protected in the constitution and/or the national laws of all 19 
countries, and all of the countries assessed in the 2015 pilot-test implementation had ratified the 
relevant international standards, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with no significant 
exceptions. Problems, however, remain, with restrictions upon freedom of expression which do 
not always meet international and regional human rights standards. The criminalisation of 
defamation in most of the countries is considered to pose risks in this regard, and, at times, it is 
coupled with over broad defamation laws, or insufficient legal defences. 
When looking specifically at the variable and sub-variables that measure the legal protection 
of freedom of expression vis à vis defamation laws, the picture that emerges from the 19 
countries is far less positive (see Figure 4). Nine countries score high risk in regard to their 
defamation laws (Austria, Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Spain), eight countries stand at the threshold of medium risk, and only two countries show a 
negligible risk in regard to the national legal provisions on defamation (Cyprus and Romania). In 
fact, Cyprus and Romania are the only two countries in which defamation had been 
decriminalised at the time of the implementation of the 2015 MPM, although problems remain 
in Romania, with back and forth decisions on re-criminalisation between Parliament, the 
Constitutional Court (CCR) and the High Court of Cassation and Justice (see also the narrative 
report on Romania attached). Overall, the criminalisation of defamation in most Member States 





Figure 4. Defamation Variable – Risks per Country 
Finally, a number of problems exist with regard to the legal remedies that are available in 
cases where there are violations of the freedom of expression, which are subject to delays or are, 
at times, ineffective in a number of countries. Cases of infringements of freedom of expression, 
either off- or online, were found to be present in several countries, including, in particular, 
Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, where 
infringements were reported both off- and online.  
 
Protection of the right to information 
The indicator on the protection of the right to information aims to assess the existence and 
effective implementation of regulatory safeguards relating to the right to information. While a 
country may have good laws relating to the right to information, they may not be fully 
implemented or enforced. The indicator is specifically concerned with the right of access to 
information that is held by public authorities and the state, the lawfulness of its limitations, as 
well as the existence and effectiveness of appeal mechanisms in cases where there is denial of 
access to information. The indicator is based on the overarching notion, as expressed by the 
former UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, that “all information 
in the possession of the State belongs to the public, with limited and qualified exceptions that 
must be justified by State authorities”.3 In measuring the presence of infringements to the right 
to information, the indicator aims to assess one of the building blocks of media freedom and 
investigative journalism. 
As presented in Figure 5, two countries were found to be at high risk in this indicator, namely, 
Luxembourg and Austria. All of the other countries were found to be at low risk, although some 
came very close to the medium risk threshold, including Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, Malta, Poland, Portugal and Romania. 
                                                     
3 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, UN Doc. A/68/362. 
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The reason for the high risk in Austria and Luxembourg originates from the legal protection 
regulating the right to information, or the lack thereof. In Austria, although Article 20(4) of the 
Federal Constitution states that there is a right to information, the obligation of the 
administrative authorities to maintain secrecy has precedence, and serious infringements of the 
right to information regularly take place in the country (see narrative report on Austria, attached). 
In Luxembourg, the right to information is not mentioned in the Constitution, and there is an 
overall lack of a fundamental and coherent right to information legislation (see narrative report 
on Luxembourg, attached).Given the importance of the right to information for media freedom, 
the lack of adequate laws regulating this area leads to a situation of high risk in both countries. 
Lower levels of risk remain in other countries, with a number of countries close to the medium 
risk threshold, mainly due to delays in appeal mechanisms or infringements relating to the 
freedom of information more broadly, including cases where the government withholds 
information, despite adequate laws being in place. 
 
 
Figure 5. Protection of Right to Information Indicator – Risks per Country 
 
Journalistic profession, standards and protection 
This indicator deals with a range of different issues concerning journalists, the key players 
promoting media freedom and media pluralism, and often those who are most at risk. These 
include, in particular: 
● Access to the journalistic profession 
● Professional journalistic associations (whether journalists are represented, and how 
effective this representation is) 
● Protection of journalists’ safety 
● Working conditions of journalists 
● Editorial content (influence by commercial entities or media owners) 
● Protection of journalistic sources  
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The overall comparative analysis of the indicator on the journalistic profession and its standards 
and protection across the 19 countries shows one country, Romania, to be at high risk, while six 
countries were found to show a medium level of risk in this key area of media freedom and 
pluralism, namely, Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Spain (see Figure 6). All of the 
remaining countries were found to be at low risk, although several came very close to the 
medium risk threshold, including the Czech Republic, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
The problems emerging from the risks to the protection of journalists, their profession, their 
associations and sources, inevitably affect the media landscape more broadly, thereby 
endangering media freedom and pluralism.  
 
 
Figure 6. Journalistic Profession, Standards and Protection Indicator – Risks per Country 
In Romania, a set of mutually reinforcing negative factors were found to put journalism in a 
precarious situation, making it open to instrumentalisation and external influences, and unlikely 
to produce quality content that is in the public interest (see country narrative report, attached), 
thereby creating a situation of high risk. The findings of an overall medium risk for this indicator 
in Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Spain, was due to a number of interrelated 
factors, as outlined below. 
The assessment of journalists’ professional associations under the 2015 MPM and, in particular, 
whether a broad section of journalists is represented by professional associations or other 
journalists’ organisations, and whether they are effective in guaranteeing editorial independence 
and respect for professional standards, found three countries to be at high risk, i.e., the Czech 
Republic, Romania and Slovakia. Eight countries were also found to be at medium risk in this area, 
including Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Spain. 
With regard to threats to, or attacks on, the physical or digital safety of journalists, five 
countries presented a situation of high risk – Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Sweden –, 
where frequent threats and some attacks were reported. Six countries were also found to be at 
medium risk, namely, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Spain. Croatia, 
Germany, Latvia, Romania and Sweden reported multiple threats to the physical safety of, and 
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attacks on, journalists in the past two years, with some threats also reported in Finland, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Spain. Threats to the digital safety of 
journalists were reported in Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania and Sweden, while several country teams reported that data was not available on this 
issue (namely, Croatia, Slovenia and Spain). 
The working conditions of journalists were reported to be particularly problematic in the 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Spain, which were all 
found to be at high risk in this sub-indicator, while a medium level of risk was found to be 
present in Croatia, Malta and Slovenia. 
With regard to the commercial influence on editorial policies and, in particular, on whether 
there are any laws or self-regulatory codes that prohibit commercial parties from influencing, or 
seeking to influence, editorial content, and whether there is evidence that commercial entities, or 
the owners of the media companies, systematically do so in practice, four countries were found 
to be at high risk: Luxembourg, Poland, Romania and Spain. Medium risk was found to be 
present in this domain in Croatia, Cyprus and Malta. In the first four countries, not only were 
commercial entities, or the owners of the media company, at times found to influence, or seek to 
influence, the editorial content of broadcasters or the press, but no laws or self-regulatory codes 
were in place to prohibit them from doing so. In the latter three countries, while laws or self-
regulatory codes were in place, there was evidence that commercial entities, or the owner of a 
media company, systematically influenced, or sought to influence, the editorial content of 
broadcasters or the press. 
Finally, with regard to the protection of journalistic sources, only one country was found to 
be at high risk, the Netherlands, due to the fact that this aspect is not (yet) enshrined in statutory 
law, although the government issued two Bills on the protection of journalistic sources in 2014. 
Similarly, Spain was found to be at medium risk in this domain, as there is no explicit mention of 
the protection of sources in the laws. However, in practice, this was reported not to constitute a 
serious issue. 
 
Independence and the effectiveness of national media authority(ies) 
The indicator on the independence and effectiveness of national media authority(ies) aimed to 
measure the fundamental issues of the independence and effectiveness of national regulatory 
authorities with competencies in the media sector. It asks a series of questions that relate to the 
three authorities which may be involved in the regulation of the media sector, namely, the media 
authority, the competition authority, and the telecommunications authority, if present, in a given 
country, and if relevant in that context. The variables which aim to construct an assessment for 
each authority cover a number of issues: whether the appointment procedures for each authority 
guarantee its independence; whether the allocation of budgetary resources to the authorities 
protects them from coercive budgetary pressures and the possibility of performing its functions, 
and the type of powers and appeal mechanisms which are in place in regard to each authority. The 
decisional practices and transparency of each authority are also assessed through specific variables. 
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Unfortunately, this indicator was found to be particularly problematic in the 2015 
implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor due to its composite structure. In particular, the 
indicator which aimed to combine the risks to the independence and effectiveness of media 
authorities, competition authorities and telecommunication authorities, was considered to be 
disproportionately large if compared to other indicators, and it was found to produce unreliable 
findings. 
Despite significant problems with regard to the independence and effectiveness of the 
authorities in many countries, the composite indicator failed to accurately capture the level of 
risk and produced an overall low level of risk for all countries. Combining the scores for all three 
types of authority into a calculated average, as well as the inclusion of a large number of variables 
for each authority, resulted in ‘watered down’ scores, which did not accurately reflect the level of 
risk in relation to the key issues of the independence and effectiveness of each authority. The 
large number of variables produced low levels of risk across the board, despite the fact that 
several country teams reported some level of risk in relation to the independence or effectiveness 
of at least one of the authorities involved in the regulation of the media sector in their country. 
This, in turn, to some extent lowered the level of risk for all of the countries in the domain of 
‘Basic Protection’. While the regulatory authorities in some countries present more problems and 
elements of risk than in others, it is suspected that the overall level of risk for ‘Basic Protection’ 
would be higher were the indicator to more accurately reflect this area of risk. The indicator will 
be significantly revised in the next version of the Media Pluralism Monitor, and this is likely to 
produce more accurate results, showing a greater variation in the level of risk.4 
 
 
Figure 7. Independence and Effectiveness of National Media Authority(ies)’ Indicator  
– Risks per Country 
 
                                                     
4 By way of example, the MPM 2014 presented very different results, since four of nine countries presented a low 
risk, two a medium, and three a high risk. At the time it was thought that the structure of this indicator should be 
revised, as the requirements needed to obtain a low risk score were too strict. In this case, the new requirements 




1.2. Analysis of Market Plurality 
Market Plurality indicators deal mostly with media ownership, an economic component that is 
widely considered to be essential in the assessment of a level of media pluralism in any given 
context. The structure of media ownership matters, firstly in assessing the influence being 
exercised by a specific media owner within a single media outlet, both in terms of internal 
pluralism and of fairness towards the readers and audience. Moreover, the level of concentration 
of media ownership is important in assessing the measure of external pluralism within a given 
media market. The MPM considers threats to media pluralism that come from the level of 
transparency and from the level of concentration in media ownership. The concentration is 
measured within the same media market (e.g., the audiovisual) and across different media 
markets (cross-media concentration). 
Specifically, there are three indicators on Market Plurality in the MPM2015: 
● Transparency of media ownership 
● Concentration of media ownership 
● Concentration of cross-media ownership 
Analysis of the market plurality indicators shows as the highest amongst all the four domains of 
risk that are perceived by the MPM: with five countries scoring high risk (Luxembourg, Finland, 
Poland, Spain and Lithuania), nine countries scoring medium risk (Romania, the Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Austria) and five a low risk 
(Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia, Malta).  
The results for this set of indicators confirm the trend shown in the analysis of the first pilot-
test implementation of the MPM (CMPF 2015). The assessment that was carried out by the 
CMPF in 2014, using a partially different list of indicators, showed medium/high risk, in what 
was previously called the Ownership Domain, in the nine countries examined (Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the UK). The comparison of the overall 
results of the market plurality assessment, both in MPM2014 and MPM2015, highlight that 
ownership-related risks are a constant element in the assessments of all of the countries 






Figure 8. Market Plurality Domain – Risks per Country 
Indeed, it is very interesting to note that, in the 2015 analysis, the countries that score a low 
risk in this domain are small countries which generally have a low GDP. Within the context of 
this research exercise, and according to the measuring methodology used, the MPM2015 results 
suggest that the widely held presumption that the media market of a small country tends 
necessarily to be especially concentrated, is not confirmed.  
According to the MPM2015’s results, in fact, amongst the 19 countries, those who score the 
lowest are precisely the small countries. The explanation of these results probably lies in the 
wider test that is used in the MPM2015 exercise, firstly, the fact that the implementation covers 
19 countries, thus offers more country cases and more reliable trends. These results are also an 
effect of the fine-tuning of the MPM2015 tool that was carried out after the above-mentioned 
2014 implementation. The revision of the MPM, in fact, aimed to balance the different 
components of the three indicators that better shape the risk domain of market plurality: a 
clearer balance between the legal, the economic and the socio-political variables (see the section 
on methodology, below) has led to results that, in general, are more tailored to the specificities of 
any given country. In the light of this achievement, while Slovakia, Cyprus, Croatia, Slovenia and 
Malta score low risk in the market plurality domain, it is remarkable that a small, high GDP 
country, such as Luxembourg, scores the highest in the market concentration indicators. The 
very high risk of two of three indicators, due to the lack of rules to control ownership 
concentration and the high concentration of the market, is not sufficiently balanced by the result 
on media ownership transparency, which, notwithstanding its medium risk, has one of the 





Figure 9. Market Plurality Domain – Map of Risks per Country 
 
Transparency of media ownership 
The first indicator in the market plurality domain is on media ownership transparency. This 
indicator aims to assess the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of the 
transparency and disclosure provisions that relate to media ownership and/or control. 
Ownership transparency can be interpreted as a sort of precondition for any reliable analysis of 
the plurality of a given media market. 
On one side, in fact, knowing who the real owners of a media outlet are gives citizens the 
possibility to gauge the extent of potential bias in the information that is provided by a media 
outlet: and, as was recently recalled by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
media ownership transparency “is necessary to enable members of the public to form an opinion 
on the value of the information, ideas and opinions disseminated by the media” (PACE; 2015). 
On another note, media ownership transparency is important from a regulatory perspective, as a 
knowledge of the owners of media outlets is a precondition for assessing the level of competition 
in the media market and for fair application, in the case of the specific rules on media 
concentration that may aim, in any given country, to limit media ownership so as to avoid 




The MPM2015 indicator on ownership transparency aims to assess the existence and effective 
implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions in relation to media ownership and/or 
control. The analysis is twofold, as the variables within this indicator take into consideration how 
the media are accountable to the public and to the public authorities when it comes to the 
structure of their proprietorship. The variables that are taken into account under this indicator 
are legal and socio-political. The indicator, then, assesses whether, in a given country, there are 
laws that deal with media ownership transparency, and whether they succeed in disclosing the 
real owners of the media outlets. This set of questions proved to be successful in highlighting 
many of the areas of opacity in media ownership throughout Europe. 
While no country scores a high risk, it is nevertheless alarming that most of the countries 
examined (12) score a medium risk. In most cases, the risk is raised by the poor effectiveness of 
laws on media ownership transparency, which do not succeed in disclosing the real owners of the 
media outlets. Some media owners remain unknown, even when a specific law on media 
transparency is in force. The law often does not envisage tracing back in order to discover how 
much control certain legal or natural persons effectively have on the media. 
Amongst the twelve countries that score a medium risk, Latvia and Lithuania score the 
highest. Both in Latvia and Lithuania (63%), the mechanisms to implement the laws, when they 
exist, are very weak, and they are insufficient to guarantee the disclosure of just who are the real 
owners. The case of Luxembourg is interesting too, as the country scores a risk of 58%, due to 
legislation on media ownership that provides very few obligations for transparency, and no legal 
sanction for non-compliance with disclosure requirements. Within this framework, the law does 
not fully succeed in ensuring that the public can know who the owners of the media are. 
There is a relevant sample of countries (7) that scores the same risk (38%) for this indicator. 
The results assess the same level of risk for countries like, for instance, Finland, Germany and 
Romania, that have media systems that are quite different. Notwithstanding this, the assessed 
risks must be evaluated according to the peculiar contexts of each single country, and it is indeed 
interesting that different systems share similar concerns and types of risks. Nonetheless, this 
indicator will be enhanced for the first EU-wide implementation in 2016, in order to comprise 
better, where possible, how, and to what extent, the opacity of media ownership affects the 
media landscape and the democratic debate. The analysis of a given country on the issue of 
media ownership transparency can also benefit from the cross analysis of other MPM2015 
indicators, such as, for instance, the indicator on the politicisation of control over media outlets. 
As an outcome of the MPM2015, indeed, similar results for the indicator on media 
transparency may suggest the need for European actions in this very sector, starting with better 
co-operation by the Authorities in setting standards and sharing information on media 
ownership. In this regard, the work that was started in 2014 by the European Regulators’ Group 
for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), must be seen as being both promising and valuable.5  
 
                                                     
5 ERGA brings together the representatives of national independent regulatory bodies in the field of audiovisual 
services, to advise the Commission on the implementation of the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive 




Figure 10. Transparency of Media Ownership Indicator – Risks per Country 
 
Concentration of media ownership 
The second indicator that occurs in the assessment of the risks for Market Plurality is that on 
the ‘concentration of media ownership’. This indicator is composed of several sub-indicators that 
aim to assess the threats for media pluralism that come from the structure of the media market. 
Risk is evaluated by taking into account the existence and effectiveness of the implementation of 
regulatory safeguards against a high horizontal concentration of ownership in different media 
markets. It does this by measuring the effective concentration of the market using the Top4 
method. Furthermore, assessment is carried out by considering the existence and effectiveness of 
ad hoc regulatory safeguards against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control 
in a specific media sector, and the existence of competition rules that take into account the 
specificities of the media sector when analysing mergers in a specific market. The assessment of 
the legal framework is linked, then, to the effective measuring of the concentration of the given 
market, and this allows for a better evaluation of the risk, considering both the legal standards 
and the effective conditions of the media market. The analysis is carried out by considering the 
different media markets (audiovisual, radio, newspapers, and online content providers). 
Another component of the indicator is a sub-indicator on net neutrality, which is made up of 
two variables that aim to assess the concentration of the ISP market and the existence of 
regulatory safeguards on net neutrality. The separate analysis of the cluster on net neutrality 
shows that only a few countries have some kind of policy in this regard. This result is 





The results of the MPM2015’s implementation confirm the trends that have already been 
highlighted by the MPM2014, and which have already been stressed by most of the studies in 
this sector, including the CMPF Policy Report: European Union Competencies in Respect of 
Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF 2013), that demonstrate that media markets have a 
strong tendency to concentration that can result in a reduction in the number of the players who 
can successfully operate in those media markets. Indeed, this is the indicator that scores the 
highest in the whole MPM2015. No countries scored a low risk. According to the data collection, 
in fact, all the markets are concentrated and show a medium to high risk for media pluralism: 8 
of 19 countries scored a high risk, and 11 a medium risk. 
The risks are mostly due to the lack of specific legislation on media concentration in countries 
that have embraced a fully competition-oriented legislation (like Luxembourg, the Baltic 
countries, or Nordic Countries like Finland and Sweden) together with high levels of market or 
audience concentration.6 High levels of concentration are a constant feature in all the media 
markets considered. The sub-indicator on media market concentration that measures audience 
and readership concentration scores a high risk for all of the countries analysed. 
 
 
Figure 11. Concentration of Media Ownership Indicator – Risks per Country 
  
                                                     




A topical issue is whether “the low number of contestants and the associated high level of 
market concentration should be regarded as having only negative implications, and whether the 
degree of concentration per se is always a meaningful indicator” (CMPF 2013). This is particularly 
important when the analysis of media concentration is carried out for small markets, which tend 
to be concentrated. The general results for the media ownership concentration area show that a 
balanced assessment of different variables within this indicator leads to results that are 
reasonable in relation to the market size of the given country. The MPM2015 duly takes into 
account many of the components of the risks that are associated with the structure of the media 
markets. In general, the results on media ownership concentration must be interpreted within the 
framework of the market plurality domain first, and of the other three domains of risk that 
compose the assessment of the MPM, as a whole. For instance, a highly concentrated market 
(which means low external pluralism) may be associated, and may be corrected in practice, with a 
good assessment of other indicators that highlight a high level of internal pluralism within the 
media outlets. 
The indicator on media ownership concentration also takes into account the digital media 
component of the market. Firstly, on the one hand, the sector-specific markets are defined 
within the framework of media convergence. On the other, as a new feature of the MPM2015, 
the indicator contains specific variables on the existence of regulatory safeguards against a high 
horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the internet content providers’ sector, 
and on the consumption of online content. The measurability of the economic variables proved 
to be difficult, as it relied on data that are not easily affordable, as such data are usually collected 
by private companies (see Section 2.2 and 2.4 for more details). 
 
Concentration of cross-media ownership 
A similar scenario is described by the results of the last indicator, which concur in assessing 
the risks for Market Plurality: Concentration on cross-media ownership. This indicator aims to 
assess the risk that results from an excessive concentration within few hands of different types of 
media. The assessment is carried out through the evaluation of the existence of regulatory 
safeguards against a high degree of cross-ownership in the different media sectors, balancing this 
with the risks coming from the effective level of cross-ownership concentration in the market. 
The methodology used to define the market concentration is the Top8 method. The indicator is 
made up of a simple set of questions on whether specific laws that set thresholds on cross-
ownership exist, and whether the specificities of the media sector (i.e., a plurality test) are taken 
into account by the authorities when applying competition law in cases of cross-media mergers 
and acquisitions. 
The results show very high risks for ownership concentration for 8 of the 19 countries, either 
because there are no specific rules that limit cross-ownership, or because the cross-media market 
is highly concentrated, or when both these conditions (legal and economic) are not met.  
Amongst the 8 countries that score a high risk, five reach a threshold of 100% risk, as they 
lack any sort of legislation covering the issue of cross-media ownership concentration, and their 
markets are already very highly concentrated. In some cases, the lack of specific data on cross 
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ownership was evaluated negatively as being a symptom of the low transparency of the 
information that is available on the media market. 
 
 




1.3 Analysis of Political Independence 
Indicators of Political independence are designed to assess the risks for the political 
independence of a national media system and its media outlets. They focus on examining the 
existence and effectiveness of the implementation of regulatory safeguards against the biased 
representation of political viewpoints in the media, and also the extent of the politicisation of 
media outlets, media distribution networks and news agencies. Moreover, they also aim to assess 
the influence of the state on the functioning of the media market, through specific influence 
through state advertising and public service media. 
Specifically, there are six indicators that are related to ‘Political Independence’: 
● Political bias in the media  
● Politicisation of control over media outlets  
● Politicisation of control over media distribution networks  
● State advertising  
● Independence of PSM governance and funding  
● Independence of news agencies  
The comparative analysis of the risks for political independence reveals that most of the 
countries examined score a medium risk, with seven being assessed at low risk from political 
influences over their media systems (Sweden, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, the Netherlands, 
Finland, and Latvia). 
The study revealed two particularly interesting cases, those of Latvia and Portugal. Latvia is 
the only country among those which have acceded to the EU since 2004 that scores a low risk 
for political independence. What makes Latvia different from the other European countries 
which have acceded to the EU since 2004 is that it scores a low risk for the two indicators in 
which the majority of these other countries were assessed as being at medium or high risk – the 
politicisation of media outlets and state advertising. With regard to the latter, the distribution of 
state advertising in Latvia does not appear to be a cause for concern. 
The Portuguese case is also interesting, since Portugal was assessed as being at low risk from 
political influences, partly due to recent changes in media legislation. Portugal is at a negligible 
risk from the politicisation of PSM due to a new law, which has de-politicised the appointment 
procedures for PSM, and the fact that direct grants to the PSM were abolished in 2013 (see the 
Portuguese report, attached, for more details). These changes to the relationships between the 
state and the PSM were deemed by the Portuguese team of experts as being useful in reducing 
the risks from political influence over those PSM, although it remains to be seen how this new 
legislation will actually be implemented, and what are the trends in its application, in practice. 
It is also worth noting that only one of the countries scores a low risk across all indicators of 
political independence (Luxembourg), and there are several countries in which all levels of risk 
(low, medium and/or high) have been found. Examples of such countries are the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, and Ireland. This points to the fact that, even though legislation is effective in 
safeguarding the media system from one type of political influence, political élites may be able to 
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exert influence in other ways. Hence, a comprehensive enquiry into the risks from political 
influence, such as that in this Monitor, is needed to detect the system’s weakest points. 
 
Figure 13. Political Independence Domain – Map of Risks per Country 
 
Political bias in the media 
The first risk for the political independence of the media is that related to the ‘political bias in 
the media’. This indicator consists of four sub-indicators which aim to assess the risks from the 
bias in the Public Service Media, the risks for PSM bias during election campaigns, the risks from 
commercial media bias, and those stemming from the regulation and use of political advertising. 
The focus of this indicator is on the risks from bias in the audiovisual media, as television 
remains the main source of news for citizens in the majority of Member States of the EU 
(Newman et al. 2015). However, it needs to be acknowledged that, in some Member States, the 
majority of citizens presently get their news online, rather than via television, and that younger 
audiences, in particular, make more use of new, rather than traditional media (ibid). 
Notwithstanding this, there is still a valid argument to be made for focusing on audiovisual 
media content and its bias, since, even in countries in which more people get news from digital 
sources rather than television (e.g. Spain, Italy, Denmark, Finland, Ireland), evidence points to 
the fact that the news sources used online are very often the websites of traditional media 
(mostly television and newspaper outlets).7 
                                                     
7 Alexa.com data that related to the most visited pages per country was used to establish this result. Particularly, the 
Top10 visited webpages, for countries in which online news are declared as being used most often than 
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The analysis of risks from political bias in the media shows that most EU Member States are at 
low risk, while five of the 19 countries examined are at medium risk from political bias (Slovenia, 
Poland, Austria, Romania, and Finland). 
It is worthwhile examining the results that were obtained in relation to the sub-indicators in 
order to highlight the similarities and differences in the ways in which countries are dealing with 
political bias in the media. With regard to political bias in PSM reporting, the data shows that all 
of the countries studied have some kind of legislation which aims to impose rules that are aimed 
at the fair, balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative 
programmes on PSM channels and services. However, these regulatory safeguards are not 
equally well implemented in all of the countries, so, in the end, four countries present a medium 
risk from political bias in PSM reporting, namely, Austria, Spain, Slovenia and Poland. To 
illustrate, although the media law prescribes that PSM reporting should be balanced and impartial 
in Austria, the body that is tasked to monitor this does not have sufficient sanctioning powers, 
and the regulatory safeguards are only partially implemented. 
When it comes to PSM reporting during electoral campaigns, the analysis has revealed that, in 
all but two countries (Finland and Austria), the law imposes rules that aim to guarantee access to 
airtime on PSM channels and services for political actors during election campaigns. Although 
these provisions are not set in law in Finland, the PSB’s Administrative Council sets the 
guidelines for electoral coverage prior to each election, taking into account the Act on Political 
Parties (10/1969), which asks that organisations governed by the State must treat all political 
parties equally and must follow uniform criteria. These, and similar safeguards, are usually well 
implemented in the EU Member States, but some bias in electoral reporting in the PSM has been 
identified in Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. However, after taking into account 
the existence of the legal safeguards, their implementation, and the actual representation of bias 
in the content, the overall risk from political bias in PSM content during electoral campaigns has 
been assessed as being at medium risk in Austria and Finland (which do not have legal 
safeguards, but where the representation during electoral campaigns seems to be unbiased and 
proportional), with Slovenia scoring at the upper end of the low risk band, and all other 
countries scoring a low risk. 
With regard to commercial media bias, Romania is the only country with a high risk from 
commercial media bias, meaning that political coverage on its commercial channels was 
evaluated as not being fair, balanced and impartial, and it is suggested that clear political bias is 
visible in this coverage. The majority of countries score a low risk, with six countries being at 
medium risk (Austria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain), pointing to the fact that, 
overall, all political viewpoints are expressed within the media system. 
Finally, the sub-indicator that looks at the risks from political advertising was designed to 
assess the extent to which political actors are allowed to, and can, use political advertisements to 
gain disproportionate representation in audiovisual media. The data shows that the risks from 
this are highest in Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which do not have any kind of regulation 
to ensure equality among parties in political advertising. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
television news, were examined. News aggregators (e.g., Google) and social networks (e.g., Facebook) were not 





Figure 14. Political Bias in the Media Indicator – Risks per Country 
 
Politicisation of control over media outlets 
The second ‘Political Independence’ indicator aims to assess the risks from the politicisation 
of control over media outlets. This indicator is composed of two sub-indicators, one looking at 
the extent of the politicisation of commercial media through examining the audience shares of 
the politically affiliated media, and another which focuses on the self-regulation which should 
ensure editorial independence and empower editors to make decisions without political 
interference. As in the previous implementation (see CMPF 2015), data collection for this 
indicator has shown that, in some countries, there is insufficient information to assess the extent 
of politically affiliated media outlets, given that information about commercial media’s political 
affiliation is rarely collected. Specifically, in 11 of the 19 countries studied the data about 
audience/readership shares for some media markets (television, radio or print) were missing. 
What makes this information even more problematic is that in nine of the eleven countries8 in 
which some data are missing, the ownership of media is not completely transparent, so the 
public may not be aware of who owns the media, and of whether or not this person/organisation 
has a political agenda. 
With regard to the other sub-indicator, which aims to assess self-regulatory measures and 
their effectiveness in ensuring editorial independence, it is important to emphasise that in eight 
of the countries studied not all of the leading media outlets have self-regulatory mechanisms 
which can secure editorial independence (Malta, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Ireland, 
Slovakia, Romania, Portugal). In Lithuania, such measures exist, but there is no body that checks 
compliance with them and imposes remedies in cases where there is non-compliance. In other 
countries, the leading commercial media have this kind of self-regulation, and it seems to be 
                                                     
8 Data are missing and there is a transparency problem with media ownership in Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, while there are no official data, but media 
ownership is, in general, transparent in Finland and Malta. 
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more or less effective. The lack of protection for editorial independence is particularly 
problematic in countries where a medium/high risk has been identified in regard to the extent of 
the politicisation of the media. For example, in countries such as Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovenia, the extent to which the media markets are politically-affiliated has been assessed as 
being at medium/high risk, and the leading media do not have the measures to secure editorial 
independence. In these situations, the system is vulnerable to political influences and there is 
little, if anything, that can protect the media from political interference. 
Overall, four countries are assessed as being at high risk from the politicisation of media outlets, 
namely, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Another seven are assessed as being at 
medium risk (Ireland, Portugal, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Malta, Austria, and Poland), while 
the rest score a low risk. Hence, all of the countries at high risk are countries which accessed the 
EU after 2004, with only Latvia from this group of countries being identified as at a low risk 
from this type of political interference. 
Finally, it is worth noting that among the EU Member States, only in Malta do major political 
parties own their own television and radio stations, as well as owning newspapers. Their combined 
audience shares are less than 30%, and it is believed that the audience is well aware of the bias in 
these media’s content. On the other end of the spectrum are countries in which the ownership of the 
media by political actors is completely forbidden by law. Such is the case in, for example, Portugal 
and Lithuania. 
 




Politicisation of control over media distribution networks 
The third indicator, which assesses the risk for the political independence of the media 
system, is ‘politicisation of control over media distribution networks’. The aim of this indicator 
was to assess the transparency of the data relating to the political affiliation of media distribution 
network owners, and the level of discrimination by politically affiliated radio and television 
distribution networks, as well as those for print media. Examples of the discriminatory actions 
that were considered have included unfavourable pricing and the posing of barriers to the media 
accessing the distribution channel. 
The analysis shows that distribution networks present a minimal risk from political influences in 
the EU, since in all but one of the countries studied they seem not to be politically affiliated and 
not to be conducting discriminatory actions. Lithuania is the only country in which distribution 
networks have been assessed as being at a medium risk from political influence, since there 
seems to be evidence that some radio, television and print distributors are politically affiliated. 
All other countries in the sample score a low risk. 
Figure 16. Politicisation of Control Over Media Distribution Networks’ Indicator –  






The fourth Political independence indicator aims to assess the importance and influence of state 
advertising on the media system. As was found in the previous implementation (CMPF 2015), the 
state can exert political pressure over commercial media by channelling funds, in the form of 
advertising, to particular, and usually to only a few, media outlets. This kind of influence may be 
especially important in times of financial crisis, when commercial media outlets are struggling to 
survive, and for local media outlets, which may be more dependent on relationships with local 
governments and the funding received for running their ads. In order to assess the risk for media 
that may stem from state advertising, this indicator consists of sub-indicators that address the 
regulation of state advertising, its distribution, and its importance in the advertising market. 
The analysis points to the fact that this type of risk is one of most expressed and common in EU 
Member States, since only four of the countries studied score a low risk (Portugal, the Netherlands, 
Latvia and Luxembourg), two of which are on the verge of medium risk (Latvia and Luxembourg). 
In addition, seven countries are assessed as being at high risk from state advertising (Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and eight countries at medium 
risk (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden). 
It is worth noting that seven of the nine countries whose risk from state advertising is set at 
50%, or higher, are countries which have acceded to the EU since 2004. However, the lack of 
regulation regarding the distribution and securing of transparency for state advertising has also 
been found in other European countries, for instance, Germany, Ireland and Malta. Overall, 
eight of the 19 examined countries do not have rules relating to the distribution of state 
advertising to media outlets, or these rules are not transparent.9 
Similarly to the issues faced in the implementation of the indicator ‘Politicisation of control 
over media outlets’, one of the challenges in assessing the risk from state advertising was the lack 
of data about its distribution and its importance within advertising markets. Specifically, in only a 
handful of countries was this kind of information available, and the reasons for the lack of data 
among the 14 countries which did not have it vary, due to the specificities of national media 
markets and their legislation. Building on this, there was an attempt to establish whether or not 
the lack of data about the distribution of state advertising and its importance for advertising 
markets should be seen as being problematic and/or as highlighting the problems with 
transparency that are related to state advertising. Of the 14 countries in which this kind of data 
was missing, the lack of data was described as being problematic in 10. Croatia is an example of a 
country in which the lack of data on state advertising is considered problematic. State advertising 
was part of a high-level corruption scandal in Croatia a couple of years ago, and this case may 
serve as a warning about how state advertising may be (ab)used in a context in which there is 
neither regulation nor transparency with regard to how it is distributed (for more details, please 
consult the Croatian narrative report, attached). Only in the Czech Republic, Germany, Latvia 
and Portugal, have local experts declared the lack of data on state advertising not to be a cause 
for concern. 
                                                     




Figure 17. State Advertising Indicator – Risks per Country 
 
Independence of PSM governance and funding 
The fifth ‘Political Independence’ indicator is designed to measure the risks for the 
independence of PSM governance and funding. Accordingly, this indicator consists of two sub-
indicators, one assessing the risks stemming from appointments to the PSM management boards, 
and another looking at the risks arising from PSM funding. The reason why it is deemed important 
to establish the risks for the political independence of the PSM are tied to its perceived role in 
society and its relationships with the state. PSM systems are usually established by the state, which, 
in some cases, still has an influence over them. Given that the PSM are thought of as being media 
that are both owned by the public and responsible to it, that are characterised by nationwide access, 
and that produce content for all communities (Smith 2012), it is feared that PSM which are under 
political influence will no longer fulfil the above-mentioned roles. Specifically, it is feared that this 
will produce biased content and reduce the ability of citizens to make informed choices. In order to 
secure its independence, it has frequently been suggested that the state should have a minimal 
ability to interfere with the appointment procedures to its boards and to exert influence by funding 
(Bardoel and Haensen 2008; Benson and Powers 2011; Council of Europe 2012; Hanretty 2009; 
Papatheodorou and Machin 2003). 
With regard to the sub-indicator that assesses the risks from the politicisation of 
appointments to PSM boards, the focus was on examining whether regulatory framework 
ensures that the appointment procedures are clear, transparent, and also minimise the possibility 
of political interference, and the extent to which these safeguards are implemented. In addition, 
it whether the state can interfere with the salaries of PSM employees was also examined. In 
relation to the sub-indicator assessing the risks from PSM funding, the legal framework for 
funding the PSM was examined, as well as the state’s ability to arbitrarily change the level of 




The analysis shows that in three countries there is a high risk to the political independence of the 
PSM, namely, in Cyprus, Slovenia, and Romania. In six other countries, potentially significant 
vulnerabilities for the PSM system were detected, with PSM systems in Austria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovakia, and Spain assessed as being at medium risk. Poland10 and Ireland scored a low risk, 
but they are close to the medium risk benchmark; while the other countries studied score a low risk. 
Within this MPM implementation, Portugal scored a low risk from political influence over the 
PSM, due to the recent establishment of the Independent General Council, which is to appoint 
PSM board members and to act as a buffer between the State and the PSM. However, it remains 
to be seen how these new legal safeguards will be implemented. Overall, the analysis that is 
related to this indicator points to the fact that certain PSM systems remain vulnerable to political 
influence, but also that some European PSM systems are changing, and their development 
should be monitored. 
 
 
Figure 18. Independence of PSM Governance and Funding Indicator –  
Map of Risks per Country 
 
  
                                                     
10 The assessment completed for this report was conducted between April and October 2015, thus not taking into 




Independence of news agencies 
The last ‘Political Independence’ indicator is concerned with the ‘independence of news 
agencies’. It consists of two elements: one measures the concentration of the news agencies’ 
market, and the other aims to establish the political affiliation of the leading news agencies. 
Although an argument may be made that news agencies in today’s digital environment are a 
less important source of information than they previously were, local partners agreed that 
news agencies remain relevant players in the news information market. They can even be 
seen as being more important nowadays than they were before, due to the time and resource 
pressures of producing media content, as a result of which some journalists simply copy and 
paste news from the wire in order to satisfy the 24/7 news demands. 
The analysis reveals that risks for media pluralism in regard to news agencies exist in all of 
the countries that have national news agencies.11 In around half of our sample the risk stems 
from the concentration of the market, while, in a number of countries, the risk also stems 
from the fact that at least one of the leading news agencies is politically affiliated. This 
affiliation is often a consequence of a historical relationship with the state, which is the 
agency’s owner and/or funder. 
Overall, three countries score a high risk (Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia), while all of the 
others that have news agencies score a medium risk. Of the countries scoring a medium risk, 
this risk assessment primarily reflects the market concentration in eight cases (Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden), while in 
the rest of the countries that scored a medium risk it also reflects the fact that (some of the) 
leading news agencies are Government controlled (Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Spain). 
 
                                                     









1.4 Analysis of Social Inclusiveness 
Social inclusiveness indicators are concerned with access to airtime and media platforms 
for different cultural and social groups, for local/regional communities, and for people with 
disabilities. They assess both the regulatory safeguards for, and the actual access to, media by 
various groups. The indicators also consider the extent of the centralisation of media 
systems; the universal access to the PSM and the Internet; and the quality of the countries’ 
media literacy policy, as well as the level of the digital media skills of the population. The 
‘Social Inclusiveness’ domain consists of six indicators: 
● Access to media of different social and cultural groups, and local communities  
● Availability of media platforms for community media  
● Access to media for the physically challenged people  
● Centralisation of the media system  
● Universal coverage of the PSM and the Internet  
● Media literacy 
Comparative analysis of the risks in the ‘Social Inclusiveness’ area shows that no country 
scores a high risk across the whole domain. Most countries (14 of 19) score a medium risk, 
and five score a low risk (Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria), as 
illustrated on the map in Figure 20. The only country scoring a low risk across all indicators 
is Sweden (9% average risk). All the other countries that, on average, display a low risk 
across the domain (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria) have at least one 






Figure 20. Social Inclusiveness Domain – Map of Risks per Country 
The medium risk in the Baltic countries (Lithuania and Latvia) is mainly due to 
underdeveloped policies on access to media for people with physical challenges, and on media 
literacy. Moreover, Latvia has limited safeguards and support for community media (high risk 
score), which hinders the provision of independently created information and pluralistic 
discussions in the Latvian media system. Ireland shows a particularly high risk in relation 
regarding the access to media for different social and cultural groups, mainly because the RTÉ, 
Ireland’s national public-service media organisation, does not seem to provide sufficient access 
to the airwaves for different social and cultural groups to the airwaves.12 
 
Access to media of different social and cultural groups, and local communities 
The indicator focuses on PSM (as opposed to commercial channels), and measures the 
existence and implementation of regulatory safeguards for access to airtime on PSM channels to 
different social and cultural groups, and the access of these groups to airtime, in practice. 
Moreover, the indicator assesses whether regional or local communities are involved in the 
production and distribution of content; whether the PSM broadcast local news programmes 
regularly, and if the PSM have legal obligations to: 
● keep its own local correspondents 
                                                     
12 For example, the RTÉ (RaidióTeilifís Éireann) schedules rarely include any programming that focuses on the 
interests of ethnic minorities within Ireland (see further details in the Irish country report, attached). 
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● have a balance of journalists from different geographical areas 
● have national news available in local languages 
Most countries are in the medium risk band, six countries, geographically spread across the 
EU, are in the low risk band, and three small countries (Cyprus, Ireland and Malta) show a 
high risk (see Figure 21). 
For example, in the case of Cyprus, there are no regulatory safeguards for access to airtime on 
PSM channels for different social and cultural groups, including minorities. In practice, these 
groups also have limited access to airtime. Access to airtime in Cyprus is mostly reserved for 
politicians, political parties, trade unions and other élite groups’ representatives. The case of 
Malta is also quite emblematic. The Maltese law does not guarantee access to different social and 
cultural groups, and local media are almost non-existent (except for community radio stations). 
Experts claim that the lack of legislation on access to media for social and cultural groups is 
mostly due to the fact that the Maltese population was rather homogenous until recently, and 
hence there was no need for such regulation. However, they also emphasise that, due to 
immigration, the structure of the Maltese population is changing, and legislation securing this 
kind of access should be discussed.13 
 
 
Figure 21. Access to Media for Different Social and Cultural Groups,  
and Local Communities Indicator – Map of Risks per Country 
                                                     
13 This information is taken from Malta’s country report, attached, where more details can be found. 
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It is also worth noting that the comparative analysis of results for this indicator has shown that the 
definition of minorities used in MPM2015 was problematic and requires further analysis. Minorities 
were defined on the basis of the definition used by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations’ 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.14 In particular, 
the definition specified that, to qualify as minorities in the framework of the media pluralism analysis, 
the people in question have to be nationals of the state and to constitute over 1% of the population.15 
This was rather restrictive, since six of the 19 countries under analysis did not have minorities, 
according to this definition. Luxembourg is a case in point: despite having circa 46% of non-nationals 
amongst its population (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques 2015), these do 
not qualify as minorities. 
 
Availability of media platforms for community media 
This indicator focuses on the availability of platforms for community media. In particular, it 
assesses whether community media is considered in the law to be a distinct group alongside 
commercial and public media, if the law safeguards the independence of community media, and 
if there are provisions reserving frequencies for this type of media. From the point of view of 
practice, the indicator assesses whether the state provides any support to community media, and 
whether the dedicated radio/TV channels and newspapers are proportionate to the minority 
populations in the country.  
The indicator on the availability of media platforms for community media shows a very mixed 
picture, with five countries scoring a low risk, eight a medium risk, and six a high risk.  
  
                                                     
14 There is no internationally agreed definition about which groups constitute minorities. For example, the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) of the Council of Europe does not 
offer a definition of a “national minority”, as there is no general definition that is agreed upon by all of the 
Council of Europe’s Member States. The CMPF has decided to use the following definition, which was given by 
the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations’ Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the 
Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti, which is often adopted by UN organisations: “a cultural or social 
group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members 
– being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the 
rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, 
traditions, religion or language.’’ (UN 1979). 
15 The definition of ‘minorities’ is relevant in the case of two indicators: ‘Access to media of different social and cultural 




Figure 22. Availability of Media Platforms for Community Media Indicator –  




Access to media for the physically challenged people  
This indicator assesses the existence and implementation of policies for the promotion of access 
to media content and services by people with physical challenges. This is the indicator displaying 
the lowest risk in the ‘Social Inclusiveness’ domain.  
Most countries (15) score a low risk, including eight with a negligible risk, and none of the 
countries scores a high risk. This means that the majority of countries have a state policy on access 
to media content by people with physical challenges. 
Moreover, in practice, most countries also address the issue by having subtitles and sound 
descriptions available for people with hearing impairments who watch TV. The four countries that 
score a medium risk (Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Croatia) all have both an underdeveloped 
policy and insufficient support for people with hearing impairments. It should be noted that the 
general low-risk situation may also be due to the limited issue coverage of this indicator, which 
only consists of two variables.16 
Figure 23. Access to Media for the Physically Challenged People Indicator –  
Map of Risks per Country 
 
                                                     
16 The two variables of the indicator focus on (i) the availability of state policy on access to media content by 
physically challenged people, and on (ii) the availability of subtitles and sound descriptions that are available for 
people with hearing impairments, who watch TV. 
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Centralisation of the media system 
This indicator assesses the legal safeguards for regional or local media by examining whether 
the law recognises them as being specific categories of media with special missions and 
obligations; whether the law reserves frequencies for regional/local radio or TV, and whether the 
media regulation prohibits networking arrangements between regional/local and national media. 
In terms of practice, the MPM examines whether the state supports regional/local media 
through subsidies, or other policy measures, and conducts a ‘decentralisation test’, which serves 
to assess the share of newspapers that is published regionally, and the percentages of the 
audience shares of regional/local radio and TV.  
Most countries (11) rank a medium risk on this indicator, and two present a high risk. One of the 
high risk countries is the Czech Republic, where the results point to insufficient legal safeguards for 
local and regional media, and the absence of state support for these types of media. In particular, 
regional and local media are not recognised in Czech media law, and the law does not reserve any 
frequencies for local or regional radio/TV. Moreover, there is no systematic state funding for these 
categories of media. The other high-risk country is, rather unexpectedly, Finland. This is because the 
Finnish legislation has no provisions to support or protect local media, and this has resulted in 
limited subsidies for this type of media. Moreover, in practice, regional television channels do not 
exist, and the audience for regional radio channels is limited.  
 
 




Universal coverage of the PSM and the Internet 
Most of the 19 countries have good PSM and Internet coverage. There are 10 low risk 
countries, and there is no high risk country. 
The PSM coverage is assured almost everywhere in EU-19, except in Luxembourg. 
Luxembourg is a peculiar case, since there are no ‘’proper’’ PSM, as such, in the country. There 
is only a public service radio channel (Radio 100.7), which is financed and controlled by the 
state. To compensate for this gap, the state has signed a ‘public service mission’ agreement 
with the private RTL Group, which dominates the Luxembourgish radio and TV media 
market.17 In addition, it is worth noting that despite the absence of a high risk for the indicator 
as a whole, several countries show high risk with regard to broadband coverage (Poland, 
Croatia, Ireland, and Cyprus). 
 
 
Figure 25. Universal Coverage of the PSM and the Internet Indicator –  
Map of Risks per Country 
 
  
                                                     
17 CLT-UFA, of which RTL is a subsidiary group, has signed a contract with the government in which it agrees to 
assume a ‘public service mission’ (the last agreement was signed in 2007 for a period of 13 years). See more 




The media literacy indicator is the indicator in the ‘Social Inclusiveness’ domain in which 
the highest number of countries shows a high risk (8 of 19 countries). The media literacy18 
indicator assesses the availability and quality of the country’s media literacy policy; as well as 
digital literacy, which is measured by the level of Internet usage and the digital skills of the 
population.  
A large majority of the 19 countries have no media literacy policy, or they have an 
underdeveloped one. Only four countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden) 
have well-developed media policies.  
Many expert teams expressed concern about inadequate or fragmented media literacy 
policies in their countries. Three of the 19 countries do not have any media literacy policy at 
all (Croatia, Malta and Cyprus).19 
The existence and quality of media literacy policies across countries does not seem to be 
random. Our analysis indicates that the four countries with well-developed media literacy 
policies all have median incomes surpassing the EU-28 average by at least EUR 4,000. On 
the other side of the spectrum, the three countries with no media literacy policies have 
median incomes that are below the EU average.20 
 
                                                     
18 Media literacy was defined in accordance with the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services’ Directive: “Media literacy 
refers to the skills, knowledge and understanding that allow consumers to use media effectively and safely. Media 
literate people are able to exercise informed choices, to understand the nature of content and services, and to 
take advantage of the full range of opportunities that are offered by new communications technologies. They are 
better able to protect themselves and their families from harmful or offensive material.” 
19 To increase reliability, the country team answers relating to media literacy policy were peer-reviewed by the 
national groups of experts. 
20 A more detailed analysis of this relationship, carried out by Matteo Cernison and Alina Östling will be available in 




Figure 26. Media Literacy Indicator – Map of Risks per Country 
 
The other two variables in this indicator focus on digital literacy, and measure Internet use 
and digital skills. The most complex among these variables is the one measuring digital skills. It is 
a composite indicator that is derived from the Digital Scoreboard Agenda, and it consists of four 
dimensions: information skills, communication skills, problem solving skills, and software skills 
for content manipulation.21 However, the media literacy indicator does not include variables that 
measure the ability to interpret or to critically assess on- or offline content. This gap is due to 
the absence of a universal definition of critical understanding of media, and to the lack of reliable 
and comparable data across Europe.  
The results on digital aspects of literacy show contrasting results. About half of the countries 
(9) score a low risk on Internet usage, and, at the same time, almost as many score a high risk (7). 
In terms of digital skills, only three countries score a low risk. Most (12 countries) score a 
medium risk, meaning that between 51% and75% of the population has basic digital skills. 
 
  
                                                     





The findings of the MPM2014 and MPM2015 implementations, even if producing tentative 
results, clearly show that no EU Member State is today free from risks to media pluralism, 
and also that each country faces specific problems or shortcomings, which reflect its 
media and political landscape. The findings of the two pilot-test implementations have 
highlighted that measuring risks for media pluralism is an essential exercise for the promotion of 
media pluralism and freedom values. The Monitor is a tool that supports policymakers, 
researchers and civil society in understanding the threat to media pluralism in different media 
systems through research, analysis and the provision of country data. 
The Media Pluralism Monitor tool has been developed over the course of two pilot-test 
implementations, which took place in 2014 and 2015 and which were funded by the EU. These 
two test implementations have revealed the extent and complexity of the problems in measuring 
threats to media pluralism in the EU Member States, and the challenges relating to the 
comparison of different values. Even more importantly, the findings have highlighted that no 
country is free from risks to media pluralism.  
The risk analysis for ‘Basic Protection’ shows that all but one country score a low risk. 
However, several countries come close to the medium risk threshold, with a risk level of 25% or 
more. Given that the ‘Basic Protection’ indicators represent the regulatory backbone of the 
media sector in every contemporary democracy, this apparently low level of risk in certain 
situations may still reveal a threat to media pluralism. 
The ‘Market Plurality’ domain, which is concerned with transparency and concentration of 
media ownership, is the domain with the highest risk. Five countries score a high risk, and nine 
countries score a medium risk in this domain, highlighting a potential threat to external 
pluralism. 
In the domain of ‘Political Independence’ which is concerned with the politicisation of the 
media, as well as with the independence of PSM and news agencies, no country scores a high risk 
for the overall domain. Most countries score a medium risk, with seven being at low risk from 
political influence over their media systems. 
Similarly, no country scores a high risk in the ‘Social Inclusiveness’ domain, which focuses on 
media literacy as well as the access to, and availability of, media for different groups in the 
population. Most countries (14 of 19) scored a medium risk.  
Even if some of the domains show limited risk levels, it is important to emphasise that high 
risks to media pluralism appear across all of the four MPM domains. This is illustrated in Figure 








‘Basic Protection’ is the domain where the fewest countries scored a high risk (see Figure 27). 
The indicators in which some countries (three) show a high risk are the ‘Protection of right to 
information’ and ‘Journalistic profession, standards and protection’. The trend of the indicator 
on the standards of the journalistic profession seems alarming in the European context. ‘Market 
Plurality’ is on the top of the list of the worst indicators. Eight countries scored a high risk, 
respectively, in regard to the concentration of media ownership and of cross-media ownership.  
‘Social Inclusiveness’ and ‘Political Independence’ are domains in which the major number of 
countries scored a high risk on one or several indicators.22 The most worrying ‘Social Inclusiveness’ 
indicators are those on media literacy and on access to media for different social and cultural 
groups, as well as for community media. In the ‘Political Independence’ domain most indicators 
(four of six) have countries scoring a high risk. Here, the high risk indicators focus on state 
advertising, the politicisation of control over media outlets, the independence of PSM governance 
and funding, as well as that of news agencies.  
In conclusion, the results of the MPM implementation demonstrate that measuring the risks for 
media pluralism is an essential exercise for the promotion of media pluralism and freedom values. 
The Monitor allows policymakers, researchers, and civil society to obtain a snapshot of the state of 
play and, potentially, of the trends that are related to media pluralism and media freedom in a given 
country. 
Each domain of the implementation of the MPM presents its own challenges, whether through 
the differences in the legal and institutional set up, the variety of political landscapes, the 
differences in the perception of media realities, or in the widespread lack of key data for measuring 
media pluralism. The pragmatic and systematic approach to underlining these problems, backed up 
by a tested and standardised methodology, represents the strength of the MPM, thereby offering 
research results that are comparable across countries, but, at the same time, they are country-
specific in providing individual assessments and concrete guidance on how to assess a specific 
situation from an objective stance. Detailed results for each country can be found in the 
Appendixes of this report (online) as a result of the work done by the national country teams. 
At a time of widespread economic and political crisis, and of rapid evolution in the digital 
world, the risks to media pluralism and the democratic project remain pressing throughout Europe, 
while they often receive insufficient attention and resources. As the High Level Group on Media 
Freedom and Pluralism have concluded in their report (2013: 4): ‘To be able to fulfil a more 
proactive role, the EU needs to be able to access up -to- date information on the state of media 
freedom and pluralism in the Member States (monitoring), as well as developing a deeper 
knowledge of this rapidly-changing sector.’ The impartial and tailored implementation of the MPM 
tool in the EU aims to help to fill these knowledge gaps by providing essential up-to-date and 
comparable analysis of media freedom and pluralism, both in the EU and beyond. This monitoring 
exercise is essential for mapping and managing the potential risks to media freedom and media 
pluralism. 
 
                                                     
22 ‘Political Independence’ has 17 countries that score a high risk on an indicator, and ‘Social Inclusiveness’ has 19 







The Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 organised the risks for media pluralism into four 
main domains of risk: ‘Basic Protection’, ‘Market Plurality’, ‘Political Independence’ and 
‘Social Inclusiveness’. This categorisation allows for an assessment that encompasses the 
different components and meanings of “media pluralism”. These domains are assessed according 
to the scoring of 19 indicators in total.  
The research design of the MPM2015 was based on a questionnaire that was compiled by the 
national country teams, which consisted of experts in media pluralism and media freedom. 
The questionnaire was composed of legal, economic and socio-political questions in order 
to allow an assessment of media pluralism risks in any given country, taking into account the 
legal framework, its implementation, and the effective conditions of the media landscape. Legal 
and socio-political questions are closed, while economic questions ask for a numeric value that is 
translated into a level of risk. This method allowed for the gathering of both quantitative and 
qualitative data, which proved to be crucial in assessing the risks for media pluralism in the EU. 
Additionally, this method allowed for the quantitative analysis of answers and the production of 
a numerical risk assessment, which was important in obtaining comparable results across 
countries. 
A second group of experts, which included national stakeholders and experts in the area, 
conducted a review of the answers to questions that required a qualitative type of 
measurement and/or a lack of measurable and easily verifiable data. 
The data were collected using an online platform that was developed by the CMPF. The CMPF 
checked and supervised the quality and consistency of the data collected and of the methodology 
used.  
The final assessment per area of risk was carried out using a standardised formula, that was 
developed by the CMPF.  
Each variable/sub-variable that was assessed by a question received a score from 0 to 1 
according to the answer to that specific question. The legal questions (yes/no replies) have been 
rated 0 or 1.The other variables (three-option replies) have been rated 0/0.5/1 according to the 
band into which the reply falls. The overall result is the average of the average of the variables of 
the same type. 
 
The research design 
The research design of the MPM2015 follows that of the MPM2014. The MPM is a tool that 
is designed to identify the potential risks to media pluralism in Member States. The risks are 
assessed within four main domains: ‘Basic Protection’, ‘Market Plurality’, ‘Political Independence’ 
and ‘Social Inclusiveness’, thus allowing a holistic screening of threats to media pluralism, which 
are not restricted to a sectorial analysis. The MPM2015 embraces a broad notion of media 
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pluralism that encompasses political, cultural, geographical, structural and institutional 
dimensions of the concept. The risks in any given domain are assessed through the relevant 
indicators that are then evaluated through a questionnaire that is made up of legal, economic and 
socio-political questions. As was established for the MPM2014, the MPM2015 mostly focuses its 
analysis on news and current affairs. However, it must be noted that, as in MPM2014, “all 
indicators that assess the general universality of media coverage and the outreach of the diffusion 
of information” (CMPF 2015) are included in the MPM2015. “They are considered to be basic 
indicators that are relevant to the infrastructure and universality principles as a whole. In 
particular, indicators on pluralism vis à vis minority coverage, outreach to disabled people, and 
media literacy, are preserved as part of this holistic principle” (CMPF 2015). 
The MPM2015 is mostly centred on secondary data analysis, the information for which is 
collected through a questionnaire-based method, which is supplemented with primary data 
gathered through interviews, where this was needed, and the analysis of legal documents, 
together with a group of experts’ evaluation of the variables that were difficult to measure 
and/or that required a qualitative type of measurement and/or that showed a lack of measurable 
and easily verifiable data .The secondary data analysis is the only method which is considered to 
be able to produce reliable and valid findings in the context of this project, due to the time and 
resource-constraints. Given that its main advantages are that data can be gathered in a faster and 
less expensive way, the secondary analysis of the available data is deemed to be the best possible 
option for assessing risks for media pluralism across a large sample in a short period of time 
(within the 12 months of the project). In addition, the first MPM pilot-test implementation 
revealed that there are many reliable, available materials which can be used as primary and 
secondary sources, e.g., national laws, case law, decision practice, governmental documents, 
NGO reports, official statistics, and academic research. Hence, drawing on these sources is a 
logical decision, due to the availability of data and resources. 
Data for MPM2015 was gathered through a structured questionnaire with closed questions 
(except for the economic questions, but benchmarks are set for these in order to calibrate them 
into qualitative answers – please see the ‘User Guide’ in the Appendix 3 [online] for details). This 
method allowed for the gathering of both quantitative and qualitative data, which proved to be 
crucial in assessing the risks for media pluralism in the EU. Additionally, this method allowed the 
quantitative analysis of answers and the production of a numerical risk assessment, which is 
important in order to obtain comparable results across countries. 
 
Methodological limitations 
The second pilot-test implementation of the Monitor in 2015 has highlighted certain areas 
which need further refinement so as to make the final research instrument as applicable and 
reliable as possible.  
The main methodological challenge during the development of the Monitor has been to select 
the right variables for measuring media pluralism, to standardise the variable questions and to 
aggregate the variables into meaningful indicators that can be used to calculate risk. In order to 
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allow the scrutiny of our method and its potential limitations, this report presents all our 
indicators and the formula that is used to calculate risks.  
Although the results of the MPM2015 should be taken more as an indication of risks, than as 
their final assessment, the findings of the second pilot-test implementation reinforced some of 
the findings of the MPM2014 (http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/results-2014/ and CMPF 2015), thus 
pointing to their validity. The findings of the MPM2015 also allowed for the identification of 
areas in which media pluralism in the EU Member States might be at more or less risk. However, 
further monitoring and analysis are needed in order to obtain a better understanding of the 
threats which a national media system may be facing.  
Finally, this analysis also pinpointed that data which are critical for assessing risks to media 
pluralism are missing in several areas across the EU Member States. These data are particularly 
important for the transparency of the relations between the media and politics. Hence an effort 
to collect these data should be made in the future in order to allow a more nuanced and accurate 
evaluation of the threats to media pluralism in the EU. 
Despite the Monitor’s limitations and challenges, which are emblematic of all international 
indices, the MPM is a useful tool that can be used to provoke public debate and to inform policy 




2.1 MPM2015 structure and calibration 
All of the questions in the MPM2015 questionnaire have been classified as being either 
variables (coded as X0.0) or sub-variables (coded as X0.0.0). Some variables are stand-alone, 
meaning that they do not have any corresponding sub-variables, while other variables, alongside 
the opening variable question, also have one or more sub-variables, which, together with the 
opening question, contribute to the risk assessment of the variable. Further, variables are 
grouped into sub-indicators, and sub-indicators into indicators, which are integral parts of each 
MPM2015 domain.  
In addition, each question in the MPM2015 questionnaire has been classified as belonging to 
one of the four question types: Legal existence (L-e) questions focused on whether or not a 
particular provision exists in a country’s legal framework; Legal implementation (L-i) questions, 
designed to examine whether due process is in place to ensure the effectiveness of the legal 
safeguard; Socio-political (S) questions were those that asked about the extent to which a legal 
safeguard is implemented, or that examines the actual practice (i.e., a reality check); while 
economic (E) questions were designed to assess the risk based on the economic data (e.g., 
market revenues, advertising shares, direct government grants to the PSM) that are related to 
media pluralism.  
In order to determine the risk for each variable, sub-indicator and indicator, a standardised 
formula has been applied to the entire MPM2015 questionnaire. The formula was designed by 
drawing from similar studies in which indices were based on a list of questions/indicators whose 
answers were calibrated on a scale from 0 to 1 (e.g., Gilardi 2002; Hanretty 2009). Hanretty and 
Koop’s (2012: 204) overview of indices for independence that are used in academic research also 
confirms that ‘for items with multiple responses, response scores have typically been equally 
distributed along the interval [0,1].’ This method of transforming answers, both quantitative and 
qualitative, into numerical values on a set scale, has been well developed in the theory of fuzzy 
sets. Specifically, the process of calibration in the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
(fsQCA) allows for the transformation of quantitative and qualitative answers of both a 
dichotomous (e.g., yes-no) and a polychotomous (e.g., low, medium, high risk) nature, into a 
scale from 0 to 1 (Ragin 2008a, 2008b, 2009). Consequently, the same method of calibration has 
been used to assign values to the answers to the MPM2015 questionnaire. 
Each variable/sub-variable received a score from 0 to 1, according to the answer to the 
specific question, with scores closer to 0 pointing to a low risk assessment, and those closer to 1 
pointing to a high risk assessment. Specifically, answers to the Legal-existence (L-e) questions, 
whose response type was yes/no, were coded as 0 or 1. Further, questions with a three-option 
reply (low, medium, high risk) were coded as 0, 0.5 or 1, according to their risk assessment. The 
same calibration was applied to the Economic questions (E), whose answers were firstly 
transformed into qualitative replies (low, medium, high risk), based on set benchmarks (please 
see MPM2015 User Guide for details).  
One of the innovations of the MPM2015 has been the introduction of the possibility to 
answer using the options ‘not applicable’ and ‘no data’ to all questions. The option ‘not 
applicable’ has been introduced to better capture the specificities of the national contexts and to 
allow for the exclusion of questions which are irrelevant, or that are applicable to a country’s 
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media system. For example, if a country does not have any recognised minorities, as defined by 
the MPM2015, all of the questions relating to minority media were coded as ‘not applicable’. 
This answering option was also used in variables with logically dependent sub-variables. For 
example, if the variable question asks whether there is a media law that aims to secure the 
pluralism of political viewpoints in the PSM reporting, and the answer to this question is ‘no’, 
then other sub-variables of this variable which ask about the existence of the body monitoring 
the law, its powers, etc., have also been coded as ‘not applicable’. It was decided that all 
questions coded as ‘not applicable’ would be excluded from the analysis and would not 
contribute to the risk assessment of the variable (if the question was a sub-variable), or the sub-
indicator, since questions answered in this way were deemed to be irrelevant to the context being 
examined.  
In regard to the ‘no data’ answering option, this was introduced primarily to allow researchers 
more flexibility in answering economic questions. As the previous implementation has shown 
(see CMPF 2015), some of the economic data are missing across many of the EU Member 
States, and in order to better capture this information, MPM2015 offered the option of a ‘no 
data’ answer. Following the choice of this answer, the country teams were asked to evaluate 
whether the lack of data represents a transparency problem within their national context, i.e., to 
evaluate whether the lack of data should be seen as being problematic in their country. In this 
way also, the specific characteristics of the national context were accounted for, since there may 
be a variety of reasons why certain data are not available/accessible across EU Member States, 
and not all of these reasons may be causes for concern. 
In order to ensure that all ‘no data’ answers contributed to national risk assessments in the 
same way, a standardised procedure to assign values to the ‘no data’ answers was developed by 
the CMPF. According to this procedure, each ‘no data’ answer was coded and assigned one 
among three possible values: 
1) Low Risk, is linked to a value of 0.25; 
2) High Risk, is linked to a value of 0.75; 
3) Missing data are interpreted as a ‘not applicable’ answer and are excluded from the 
analysis. 
The number of the ‘missing data’ values was limited, as much as possible, and was adopted 
only as a residual category in cases where comments that evaluated the reason behind the lack of 
data were missing, incomplete, or were impossible to interpret. 
In other cases, the following procedure was applied: 
Firstly, if the team member took a position in the answer, indicating that a high risk is present, 
or, in contrast, that the lack of data is not problematic, the CMPF has followed this suggestion and 
has coded the ‘no data’ accordingly, with either a low or a high risk value. In cases where the 
answer was vague, or where its meaning had to be deduced, the following criteria were considered: 
a) Taking into account the local context: If the data are not collected because they are 
considered to be of limited interest, e.g., because the country is too small to collect detailed 
information, because a particular medium has a very limited reach, etc., a ‘low risk’ value 
was assigned  
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b) If there is a legal requirement to collect the lacking data, a ‘high risk’ value was assigned 
c) For questions concerned that are with the audience data and the revenue/market share 
data: 
- if the country presents data on audience, but not on revenues/market share: the market 
share data is excluded from the analysis, i.e., the answer is given a ‘missing data’ value, 
meaning that the findings are based on the audience variable alone. In other words, the 
revenue data are considered to be optional. 
- if the country presents data on the revenues, but not data on audience shares: the lack 
of audience shares data is coded as being ‘high risk’ in all cases, since it is the standard 
reference for the market.  
- if the country produces neither data on the audience, nor on the market share: 
according to above mentioned rules, the lack of audience shares’ data is coded as being 
‘high risk’, and the lack of market shares data as being ‘missing data’ 
All ‘no data’ assigned values have been double coded, meaning that two independent coders 
assigned to each ‘no data’ answer one of the three values. In cases where the coders disagreed, a 
discussion was held between the coders until a consensus about the final value was achieved. 
 
MPM2015 aggregation method 
The aggregation method relied on the approaches used in previous, similar studies (for an 
overview see Hanretty and Koop 2012), but taking into account the traditions and logic of the 
Media Pluralism Monitor Project. Specifically, the method based on the mean of the item scores, 
used as the most common aggregation method in calculating indices, was updated to take into 
account the logic of the MPM, which has traditionally relied on the groupings of legal, socio-
political and economic indicators. Consequently, the procedure for establishing the risk 
assessment of an indicator was as follows: 
1) calculate the mean of L-e within one variable (variable + sub-variables) 
2)  calculate the mean of L-i within one variable (variable + sub-variables) 
3)  calculate the mean of 1) and 2). This is the value of the L variable (the L variable is ‘e’ or ‘i’ 
according to the type of opening question/variable) 
4)  calculate the mean of the L-i variables within the sub-indicator 
5)  calculate the mean of the L-e variables within the sub-indicator 
6)  calculate the mean of 4 and 5 to get the L value within the sub-indicator 
7)  calculate the mean of E variables within the sub-indicator 
8)  calculate the mean of S variables within the sub-indicator 
9)  calculate the mean of 6), 7) and 8). This is the result of the sub-indicator. 
10)  the value of the indicator is the mean of all its sub-indicators. 
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Finally, the risk assessment of the domain is calculated as the mean of all its indicators. It 
should be noted that all values were presented as percentages for ease of use and interpretation 
(e.g., a score of 0.46 is presented as a risk of 46%). 
The procedure for determining the risk assessment of variables, sub-indicators, indicators and 
domains, detailed above, allowed the MPM to benefit from a standardised formula for all levels 
of the Monitor. This enhanced the comparability of results among the different levels of the 
Monitor, decreased the arbitrariness in assessing the risk assessments of the various indicators, 
and, overall, this increased the validity and reliability of the findings. Furthermore, this formula 
also contributed to establishing a better balance between the evaluation of the legal framework 
(L variables) with the evaluation of the actual practice, captured by socio-political and economic 
variables. Finally, the MPM2015 formula also enabled the establishment of risk assessments 
which are better tailored to the specificities of the national contexts (through the introduction of 
the ‘not applicable’ and ‘no data’ answers). In this way, the differences between the Member 




2.2 Improvements from MPM2014 
In the course of the project, the CMPF revised the MPM2014 tool and developed a new 
MPM version (MPM2015), which was tested in 19 EU countries. The revision of the MPM2014 
tool consisted of a thorough analysis of the shortcomings that were noted in the first MPM 
implementation. Based on this analysis, the CMPF teams updated some of the indicators and 
variables, revised the User Guide, and adapted the online platform in line with the new 
questionnaire.  
The analysis of the shortcomings of the first MPM implementation was based on the SMART 
criteria. These criteria were used during the pilot-test of the MPM2014, and the CMPF asked the 
local teams of the 9 selected countries to score and assess the validity of each of the 34 indicators: 
● Specific (if it had a sufficiently precise meaning, and a clear and direct link with media 
pluralism); 
● Measurable (if the indicator could be expressed by quantitative or qualitative scores); 
● Achievable/Attainable, if data were available or it were technically possible to obtain data 
within a reasonable time frame and at a reasonable cost; 
● Result-oriented: if it were feasible to define reliable border values; if there were general 
agreement over interpretation of results; 
● Time-bound: data can be collected frequently enough to inform the progress and influence 
the decisions (data on this criterion were not provided by all the teams, as it was not 
mandatory to reply to the related question, since the MPM was supposed to measure the 
status of media pluralism at a given moment in time). 
In general terms, the analysis of the SMART data showed that legal indicators were assessed 
as being the most clear and specific, and were well selected and useful, for the specific purpose 
of assessing the risks for media pluralism. A better differentiation between the adoption of legal 
measures and their implementation was suggested, as well as a more detailed correspondence 
between the questions on the existence of a legal framework and the existence of a relevant 
monitoring and sanctioning system, appeal mechanisms and their effectiveness. In some cases, 
major revisions were carried out that were based on the SMART analysis. 
All of the economic indicators were generally assessed as having a clear and direct link with 
media pluralism and freedom. Some questions were raised on the availability of the data 
requested, on the clarity of the methodology for measurement, and on the need to better 
differentiate the indicators, depending on whether they were applied to small or big countries 
(see the discussion on the coefficients, below). The socio-political indicators were generally 
assessed as effectively describing the most important aspects of media pluralism and media 
freedom. As formulated, they had a sufficiently precise meaning, but they were the most 
problematic in terms of measurability and attainability. In particular, the use of content analysis 
was criticised as being both too expensive and too limited in scope. 
Building on these reflections, the CMPF again analysed the logic of the MPM2014 in order to 
assess whether the tool was covering all the possible risks, taking into account also the internal 
Methodology 
55 
assessments that the CMPF elaborated during the 2014 test.1 Moreover, the current academic 
and policy debates on media pluralism topics were taken into account. In particular, the CMPF 
checked whether any new essential component for the assessment of media pluralism in news 
and current affairs needed to be added. 
The CMPF made an additional effort to further simplify the MPM, in order to obtain a more 
user-friendly and streamlined tool than the already simplified MPM2014, and to enhance its 
general usability. The key methodological issues addressed were: 
● The application of coefficients to certain variables 
● The balancing of different types of variables (legal, economic, and socio-political) 
● The clarifications of variables and the enhancement of the online platform 
● The improvement of the measurements of pluralism in the digital world 
● Accounting for the lack of data, and cases in which the country teams claimed that 
certain indicators were not applicable in a specific media landscape. 
● The standardisation of the method for measuring risks across indicators and domains. 
These issues are discussed in the following sections. 
 
Coefficients 
The issue of whether certain variables need to be weighted by coefficients was raised 
following the pilot implementation of MPM2014. Several stakeholders expressed concern that 
some variables might not accurately capture the media pluralism risks in all of the EU countries 
due to the specific characteristics of the media markets in their countries. Consequently, the 
application of coefficients was thoroughly debated in the CMPF, in particular, the following 
issues: 
● How to account, if at all, for market size in measuring the risks arising from media 
ownership and concentration? 
● How, if at all, should the consumption and the impact related to different media (i.e., TV, 
radio, print, internet) be accounted for in evaluating the risks for pluralism? 
The argument in favour of applying coefficients is, as stated above, that specific 
characteristics of the media markets, or the consumption of news through a preferential media, 
should be taken into account in order to produce a more accurate evaluation of the media 
pluralism risks. Information which could be used for such weighting might include the 
population size, GDP, audience shares, or market shares per medium. 
There are, however, several counter arguments against applying coefficients. Firstly, the 
decision to apply a particular coefficient would mean that there is an implication of a causal 
connection between the independent (coefficient) and dependent variable (that which is being 
weighted). With the example of the influence of market size on media concentration, the 
                                                     
1 Please note that the application of the tool in Italy was carried out directly by CMPF researchers. 
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problem is in determining, with some degree of certainty, that it is precisely the size of the 
market which is influencing the media concentration. In other words, the reason why media 
markets are concentrated in different countries may vary, and the application of a particular 
coefficient, which may be relevant for one, but not all, countries, would produce misleading 
results. Secondly, the most plausible independent variables which could be used for weighting do 
not seem to be connected in a linear fashion with the dependent variables. Specifically, while 
small market size may be connected with concentrated markets, there is no evidence to suggest 
that large markets are connected with significantly less concentration in media markets. Hence, 
applying coefficients would distort the data if they were applied to the entire sample of the 
countries analysed. 
The final decision not to apply coefficients was taken following data analysis, which 
confirmed that it is not possible to claim that one factor has a decisive influence across the EU 
Member States and that must be taken into account. The most obvious example of this is that 
the MPM2015 results show that small countries do not necessarily score a high risk in the 
‘Market Plurality’ domain. On the contrary, almost all of the countries that score a low risk for 
this domain can be characterised as being countries with small markets (Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, 
Slovenia). Hence, applying coefficients in this context could not be justified.  
Furthermore, the decision not to apply coefficients was also taken with the aim of minimising 
the researchers’ interventions in the data and findings. In other words, it was deemed better not 
to intervene in the results by mathematically altering them for any reason, and eventually to 
explain them by contextualisation. 
 
Balancing legal, socio-political, and economic variables 
In the process of restructuring the MPM, the CMPF also dedicated particular attention to the 
balance between legal, socio-political, and economic variables. To compensate for the 
overemphasis on legal issues in MPM2014, and to better capture the complex nature of some of 
the media pluralism aspects, many of the variables concerning the implementation of legal 
standards – which had previously been classified as legal – have been changed into socio-political 
variables. This allowed for a wider range of answers (three options, versus yes/no categories) and 
the answers captured more of the nuances of media pluralism for MPM2015.  
Further, the MPM2015 indicators have been clustered around common themes, making the 
distinction between legal and non-legal indicators less rigid, and allowing for different types of 
variables to be measured within a single indicator. In this way, MPM2015 took a more holistic 
approach to measuring risks, since the risk assessment of each indicator reflects the risks from 
the legal, economic, and socio-political perspectives combined.  
 
Update of the user guide and enhancement of the online platform 
A major innovation in the online platform was the addition of explanations about what 
exactly is being assessed by each variable, and the provision of suggested sources for each 
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variable, or sub-variable. This has been proven to be extremely useful in avoiding confusion and 
in significantly reducing the requests for clarification from country teams. A particular effort was 
devoted to checking the consistency of the Glossary and to modifying the definitions according 
to the SMART assessments in 2014. 
The combination of better-defined variables, explanations about what is being measured, and 
in what way, and revised definitions, has resulted in a clearer and more comparable monitoring 
tool. Further, the requirement for country teams to provide comments in the online platform for 
each variable (e.g., a summary of the relevant law in English) and to indicate the relevant sources 
for each variable, has allowed the country teams to explain their answers and to tailor them as 
necessary. This innovation has also allowed the CMPF to gather a great wealth of useful 
information and sources that relate to media pluralism and freedom in the EU. 
 
Digital indicators 
The MPM2015 has expanded and refined the use of digital variables in respect of the previous 
MPM versions. If compared to the MPM2014, the CMPF has changed several indicators that 
assess the risks for pluralism in digital environments. CMPF is engaged in a permanent debate 
with other academics and institutions who are discussing these topics in order to find suitable 
solutions for the measuring of the plurality of the offer and of the consumption of information 
online, with a special focus on the role of the content intermediaries of the web. With the new 
variables, we have strengthened the capacity of the MPM to assess these types of risks.  
MPM2015 puts emphasis on the digital dimension in three of the four risk domains (in the 
Basic Protection, Market Plurality and Social Inclusiveness domains). It addresses key media 
pluralism aspects, such as: 
● The safety of journalists, and the violation of freedom of expression online;  
● The ownership concentration of Internet content providers and Internet service providers; 
● Net Neutrality; 
● The access to, and quality of, the Internet infrastructure; 
● The use of the Internet and digital skills. 
In particular, the new variables aim to: 
● Put more emphasis on the digital dimension in the ‘Basic Protection’ domain (i.e., by 
asking about threats to the digital safety of journalists, filtering, and censorship in social 
networks). 
● In the ‘Market Plurality’ domain, the CMPF added variables with which to assess the 
market shares of internet content providers, including digital intermediaries, and online 
content consumption concentration. Moreover, the CMPF took into consideration the 
revenue market of digital intermediaries in assessing the cross-ownership concentration. 
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● Concerning Net Neutrality, with the new variable, the CMPF has designed a softer 
approach to assessing the risk of control over data flow. The outcome for this variable is 
obtained by combining the concentration of ISPs in a given country and the existence of 
regulatory safeguards on net neutrality. 
● As for access to the Internet, the CMPF now covers this, with variables on the broadband 
coverage of the rural population and on the overall broadband penetration in the country, 
in the ‘Social Inclusiveness’ domain. 
● The quality of access is measured by the speed of broadband (upload and download) in the 
‘Social Inclusiveness’ domain. 
● Internet use and digital skills are considered to be an important part of media literacy, and 
they are measured in the ‘Social Inclusiveness’ area. 
The digital indicators of the MPM2015 were discussed during a meeting with the British 
media regulator, the Office for Communication (Ofcom), scholars at the London School of 
Economics and the Political Science Media Policy Project, at the Reuters Institute for the Study 
of Journalism, commercial enterprises that specialise in digital audience research, and a number 
of experts in digital media pluralism. The meeting was held at the LSE’s premises in London. 
The conclusion of this discussion was that measuring pluralism in the digital world remains a 
very challenging task, and that the best method for measurement remains to be found. 
MPM2015’s variables, which aimed to assess media pluralism online, seem to capture some, but 
not all, of the aspects of online pluralism, but stakeholders warn that reliable comparative data, 
which would allow for the assessment of the elements which have emerged as being particularly 
important for online pluralism in recent years, are not being collected (e.g., the audience shares 
of online content providers, the role of news aggregators, such as Google, the role of social 
networks in providing news, etc.).The methodological effort and the data gathering in this area is 
still ongoing and are relatively far from being concluded.  
 
Formula 
The formula used in the Media Pluralism Monitor 2014 relied on the proposed formula of the 
initial MPM from 2009. Accordingly, MPM2014 had a scoring-grid structure with differences in 
the ways in which the risk assessments of the indicators of different types were calculated. For 
example, each question in a socio-political indicator contributed to the indicator’s risk assessment 
in the same way, while this wasn’t the case with the legal indicators. Another issue that was 
detected in relation to the MPM2014 formula related to the scoring system for legal indicators, 
since these scoring systems differed from indicator to indicator. In addition, it was pointed out in 
the discussion following the MPM2014 data analysis that scoring criteria for some of the legal 
indicators appeared too strict, while, for some others, they appeared too loose. For example, the 
indicator assessing the risks from the ‘Regulatory safeguards for the independence and efficiency of 
the relevant national authorities’ was described as being too strict, as a low risk assessment was 
possible only if all of the criteria were satisfied (i.e., all 31 questions had to be answered with ‘yes’). 
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Analysis of the MPM2014 formula also revealed that the MPM’s methodological design could 
be better grounded in an established empirical background, particularly in those theories and 
methods that deal with indices and comparative measurements, in order to be more in line with 
academic practice and modern research traditions. 
Hence, one of the fine-tuning exercises was an attempt to standardise the calculation of risks 
across all of the indicators and domains, and, in this way, to increase the comparability and validity 
of the entire tool. Consequently, the formula for measuring risks in MPM2015 was changed. The 





2.3 Changes introduced per domain 
Alongside the general methodological innovations that are described above, a number of 
changes were made to the MPM tool in order to improve the structure and the coherence of the 
domains, the indicators, and the variables. While the substance and the spirit of the MPM remain 
the same, its restructuring into four domains and 19 indicators has made the tool even more 
user-friendly and more accessible to a broader public.  
Variables which were found to be problematic during the first pilot-test have either been 
modified or re-worded, and an attempt was made to better define what was being measured in 
order to allow for a more precise picture to emerge. As a result, some variables which were 
considered problematic, or that were simply too vague, were either removed or were broken 
down into different questions. Furthermore, a number of variables, which were not present in 
the MPM2014, but which were considered to be important in capturing media pluralism and 
freedom today, were added, including, for instance, the safety of journalists and, in particular, 
their digital safety. 
A detailed description of the changes that have been introduced to the MPM is available in 
Annexe 2 (online), the MPM2013/14 and in the MPM2015 comparison table. 
 
Basic protection domain 
The ‘Basic Protection’ domain in MPM2015 corresponds to the ‘Basic’ domain in MPM2014. 
Being composed of indicators that aim to assess the basic safeguards for freedom of expression 
and media pluralism, this part of the MPM was not deeply changed, but it was fine-tuned 
according to the remarks that arose from the MPM2014’s implementation. 
In particular, the first indicator on the basic protection of the freedom of expression was 
enhanced with a more detailed analysis on defamation. In general, the indicators, composed 
mostly of legal variables, have been balanced with more socio-political variables, which have 
stressed the component of the “reality check” in the final assessment of the effectiveness of 
guaranteeing the basic principles. 
The indicator that was modified the most is that on the status of journalists (Journalistic 
profession, standards and protection) that merges the indicator on regulatory safeguards for the 
journalistic profession with that on the presence of professional associations providing advocacy 
for editorial independence and respect for professional standards. Moreover, the indicator was 
enhanced in order to better take into account the issues of journalists’ working conditions and 
the safety of journalists, including their digital safety. As mentioned above, the indicator on 





Market Plurality domain 
The ‘Market Plurality’ domain in MPM2015 corresponds to the ‘Media Ownership and 
Control’ domain in MPM2014. 
While the indicator on media ownership transparency is maintained in the same format as the 
one in MPM2014 (with just the introduction of a socio-political variable, which aims to balance 
the legal questions with a “reality check”), the two indicators on ownership concentration merge 
the legal indicators with the economic ones on market concentration. 
The result is, then, that for the indicator on the concentration of media ownership, three 
MPM2014 indicators are merged: that on the regulatory safeguards against the high 
concentration of ownership and/or control, with the economic indicators that measure the 
effective concentration of the media markets, both in terms of market shares and 
audience/readership shares. 
As mentioned, above, in this report, the MPM2015 changes the approach of MPM2014 
(oriented to measure the risks to media pluralism through assessing the risks to fair access to 
digital online platforms) and takes into better account the online dimension of market plurality, 
in terms of the availability and consumption of online content. This results in an indicator that is 
enhanced with legal variables so as to assess the existence of any framework that regulates the 
concentration of the market for online content providers, and with economic variables on the 
ownership concentration of Internet content providers. The indicator on ownership 
concentration contains, moreover, two variables that measure the risks for network neutrality: an 
economic variable assessing the concentration of the ISP market, and a variable assessing the 
existence of regulatory safeguards for the impartial transmission of information, without regard 
to content, destination or source. 
The indicator on cross ownership concentration merges the MPM2014 ’s legal and economic 
indicators on cross ownership (regulatory safeguards against a high degree of cross ownership 
between television and other media and the number of sectors in which Top8 firms/owners 
are active). 
 
Political independence domain 
The ‘Political Independence’ domain is that which corresponds to the ‘Political Pluralism in 
the Media’ domain in MPM2014. Although the domain has been restructured, it remains focused 
on assessing the risks for media pluralism that are associated with the politicisation of media 
content, public service media, commercial media outlets, media distribution networks, and news 
agencies.  
The main issues that the CMPF has improved in this domain, with respect to the previous 
MPM version, are: 
● The simplification of the assessment of political bias in the media, through the 
replacement of its method of measurement (content analysis has been replaced by 
secondary data analysis) 
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● The differentiation between the risks for commercial media outlets and media distribution 
networks, through the disintegration of MPM2014 indicator 30 (political control over 
media and distribution networks’ ownership) 
● The strengthening of the indicator assessing the risks from state advertising, by adding 
additional methods of assessment, and through its elevation to a stand-alone risk. 
With regard to the first point, it is worth mentioning that the simplification of MPM in 2014 
had already heavily reduced the use of content analysis, if compared with what was initially 
planned in the 2009 version of the Monitor. For the purposes of the pilot implementation in 
2014, the sample for content analysis included the news and current affair programming of two 
TV channels in each country during the European Parliament election campaign, which was held 
in May. Due to resource constraints, the analysis focused on campaign reporting on only two 
days in the entire campaign. The limitations of the sample raised questions about the validity and 
reliability of the findings from the content analysis, and also of the conclusions which could be 
derived from this data. 
Hence, the results of the data collection for MPM 2014 showed that an effective and reliable 
implementation of the content analysis method demands a longer monitoring period, and also 
the inclusion of a wider variety of media outlets and platforms. In addition, this type of 
international research undertaking would need to ask for the co-ordinated training of the coders, 
in order to ensure inter-coder reliability across countries, and to ensure the validity of findings. 
Consequently, the lesson learned from the MPM2014 implementation was that content analysis 
is too resource intensive (in terms of time, people, and money) and this is at odds with the 
budget constraints of the MPM project. 
It was thus decided to change the method of measurement of the variables assessing the 
political bias in the media. Desk research has shown that there is secondary data, often national 
case studies of political bias that are based on content analyses of media, which can be used to 
assess political bias in the media. Accordingly, in the MPM2015, the issue of political bias in the 
media is assessed by the following socio-political variables: 
P.1.3. Is there evidence to suggest that audiovisual reporting on commercial channels offers 
balanced and impartial representation of political viewpoints in news and informative 
programmes? 
P1.4.7 Is there evidence to suggest that audiovisual coverage of electoral campaigns on PSM 
offers proportional and non-biased representation of the different groups of political actors? 
The suggested method for the measurement for these variables is academic research on the 
topic of political bias in the media, or, alternatively, case law, decision practice, press reports, the 
reports of independent bodies or NGOs, ethics councils, the press council, the press complaints’ 
commission, the media ombudsman, etc. 
Although conducting a cross-national content analysis will ensure the universality of the 
criteria according to which political bias is measured, it was estimated that the validity of data 
would not be significantly reduced by relying on secondary data that are derived from the 
national research of political bias. These national studies, or reports, have the advantage of taking 
into consideration nation-specific patterns of biased reporting, and of examining political bias in 
Methodology 
63 
a more nuanced way, than would perhaps be the case for an unavoidably resource-limited cross-
national analysis.  
Furthermore, in order to be able to better differentiate between the risks for the political 
independence of commercial media outlets and media distribution networks, Indicator 30 from 
MPM2014, entitled: political control over media and distribution networks’ ownership, has been 
disintegrated and split into two indicators. The new indicator was designed to assess the risk 
arising from the politicisation of commercial media outlets, and it has been strengthened by 
adding variables that aim to measure the extent to which each media market (audiovisual, radio 
and print) is politicised, in practice, by examining the reach (audience shares) of the politically 
affiliated media in different media markets. The other new MPM2015 indicator, which assesses 
the risks from the politicisation of media distribution networks, has been designed to focus solely 
on assessing the extent to which media distribution networks are politically affiliated, and/or take 
discriminatory actions. This differentiation proved to significantly clarify the risks for the 
politicisation of the media system, since the indicator assessing the politicisation of commercial 
media outlets proved to be one of the most problematic, while that on the politicisation of media 
distribution networks, showed the lowest risk levels across EU-19 (for further detail, see Section 
1.3 of this report).  
Finally, another major improvement of the domain that assesses the risks for the political 
independence of the media was the establishment of a stand-alone indicator that assessed the 
risks from state advertising. In the first pilot-test implementation, Indicator 31: political control 
over media funding by advertising, was designed to assess the risk from state advertising, but it 
was not a stand-alone indicator that contributed to the risk assessment of the domain, rather, it 
was combined with two other indicators so as to assess the risk from the excessive politicisation 
of media ownership/control. In the discussion about the implementation of the MPM2014, local 
teams, who carried out the implementation, argued that the indicator assessing state advertising 
had not been given enough importance, since the state, particularly in some of the countries of 
Central Eastern Europe, has a history of abusing state advertising in an effort to politicise 
commercial media outlets. Following this discussion, the decision was taken that the indicator 
that assessed the risks from state advertising would be a stand-alone indicator, directly 
contributing to the risk assessment of the ‘Political Independence’ domain. In addition, in order 
to make the indicator more comprehensive, several new variables were designed and were added 
to MPM2015. These were concerned with assessing the importance of state advertising in 
different national media markets (television, radio, print) by looking at the share of state 





Social Inclusiveness domain 
‘Social Inclusiveness’ became a new domain by merging the previous indicators on cultural, 
geographical and type/genre issues. The new ‘Social Inclusiveness’ domain groups together 
indicators that are concerned with the access to, and availability of, media for different, and 
particularly for vulnerable, groups in the population. They assess the regulatory and policy 
safeguards for access to the media by various cultural and social groups, by local communities, 
and by people with disabilities. Moreover, they assess the centralisation of the media system, and 
the quality of the country’s media literacy policy, as well as the population’s digital media skills. 
One of the key issues that was improved by the CMPF, in this domain, in respect of the 
MPM2014 version, was the clarification of definitions and the removal of terms or variables that 
could not be clearly defined. In particular, the term “minorities” was not interpreted in a 
common way by the country teams during the implementation of the MPM2014. The CMPF has 
therefore elaborated a more detailed definition, one that is mainly based on that of the Special 
Rapporteur of the United Nations’ Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
the Protection of Minorities. Another example of an unclear term that was used in MPM2014 
was ‘’local events’’, in the variable “Does the PSM cover local events regularly?” Given that no 
clear and relevant definition of ‘’local events’’ could be found in the literature, this variable was 
dropped from the MPM2015. Moreover, the variable: ‘’what is the combined ownership of 
regional/local and national media outlets by the same company?’’ was removed, because the 
sampling procedure (proposed by MPM2009) was unclear, and because the established 
thresholds were neither explained nor referenced clearly. Finally, as in the other domains, the 
question of legal implementation was given careful consideration and the set of legal 
implementation sub-variables was assigned to specific variables (e.g., I1.1.1-I1.1.5), as opposed to 




2.4 Data collection 
Given that the MPM2015’s research design, as was that of MPM2014, rests on two main 
methods – a questionnaire and a group of experts’ evaluation – two main types of data were 
collected during its implementation – answers to the questionnaire, and comments from the 
experts engaged in the evaluation of the answers.  
The questionnaire 
The MPM2015 questionnaire was answered by national teams that were composed of 
renowned experts in media pluralism and media freedom in each of the countries analysed, 
excluding Malta, for which the CMPF carried out the data collection in order to have first-hand 
experience of implementing the tool. For several reasons, co-operation with national teams of 
experts proved to be essential during the implementation of the MPM2015. Firstly, due to the 
necessity of relying on secondary data, which is often in the native language, it was essential to 
have local experts who were able to collect these data, but also to evaluate their reliability and 
validity. Another benefit of using a local team to implement the Monitor was the ability to build 
on their access to their local networks, particularly access to the local stakeholders. Given that 
one of the objectives of this project was to establish and maintain contacts with the relevant 
stakeholders, local teams’ input in growing the network of informed stakeholders who join in the 
discussions on media pluralism, has proved to be invaluable. Finally, local teams are fundamental 
in providing answers to socio-political questions, those about the extent to which a legal 
provision related to media pluralism is actually implemented. In answering some of these 
questions, local teams have to provide their expert evaluation, since objective ways of 
measurement are sometimes missing. Hence, having a reliable and independent local team which 
consists of renowned experts in this field, was crucial for the implementation of this project. 
Local teams which carried out the implementation of the MPM2015 (see Figure 28). 
Local teams provided answers to the questionnaire, which were accompanied by comments in 
which the rationale for the answer was described, and the sources on which the answer was 
based were given on the online platform which was designed during the pilot-test 
implementation in 2014, and which was further developed in 2015. The platform allowed for 
centralised data collection and the comparison of answers, and it is an invaluable asset in a cross-
national comparison of this scale. The online platform contains not only the questionnaire and 
the answers to it, but also detailed descriptions of variables/questions, suggested databases and 
methods of measurement, a glossary containing definitions, FAQs, and other elements which 
were designed in co-operation with local teams in order to facilitate data collection and to ensure 




 Country Institution Key person 
Austria 
Institute for Comparative Media and 
Communication Studies (CMC) Austrian 
Academy of Sciences 
Josef Seethaler 
Croatia 
Institute for Development and International 
Relations (IRMO) 
Paško Bilić 
Cyprus  University of Nicosia Christophoros Christophorou 
Czech Republic Charles University Vaclav Stetka 
Finland University of Jyväskylä Heikki Kuutti 
Germany Hans Bredow Institut Hermann Schroeder 
Ireland Dublin City University Roddy Flynn 
Latvia Riga Stradins University Anda Rozukalne 
Lithuania Vytautas Magnus University Aukse Balcytiene 
Luxembourg University of Luxembourg Raphael Kies 
Malta CMPF CMPF 
Netherlands University of Antwerp Miriam van der Burg 
Poland  University of Krakow Beata Klimkiewicz 
Portugal Universidade Nova de Lisboa Francisco Rui Nunes Cádima 
Romania Median Research Centre Marina Popescu 
Slovakia School of Communication and Media Andrej Skolkay 
Slovenia University of Ljubljana Marko Milosavljević 
Spain Univ. Castilla – La Mancha Juan Luis Manfredi Sanchez 
Sweden University of Gothenburg Mathias A. Färdigh 
Figure 28. MPM2015 local teams  
Another benefit of the online platform as a centralised data collection vehicle was that it 
allowed the CMPF to continuously monitor the progress of the data collection, in order to verify 
the quality of the responses, and to provide feedback to the local teams on how to review their 
answers in order to increase their quality and/or comparability. Specifically, during the data 
collection of the answers to the MPM2015 questionnaire, the quality and comparability of the 
answers was checked by the CMPF following two checkpoints (one at the end of May. when 
50% of the answers for the questionnaire were due, and another at the end of June, when 100% 
of the answers to the questionnaire were due. Frequent centralised verifications of the local 
teams’ answers were necessary in order to ensure that all of the teams had understood a question 
in the same way, that the sources used for the answers were relevant and adequate, and that the 
evaluations of the answers were carried out and were based on the same criteria across countries. 
In addition, frequent validation points have ensured that the final datasets are as complete and 
comparable as possible, and also that the time-frame and deadlines for the project were followed 
and respected.  
One of the biggest challenges to the MPM2015’s implementation was to ensure the validity 
and reliability of the data, which were based on the evaluations and answers to those questions 
for which no objective measurement exists. Building on the experience of the first pilot-test 
implementation, this implementation also relied on the revision of particularly sensitive and/or 
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difficult to measure questions by national experts and stakeholders. This part of the research 
design ensured that the validity of the results was increased, and that relevant stakeholders had a 
say in the project and an opportunity to share their views and opinions. 
 
Group of experts’ procedure 
In comparison to the first pilot-test implementation, this part of the methodology was more 
robust and standardised. The procedure for the group of experts’ evaluations was as follows. The 
process was started by the local teams’ nomination of seven experts and stakeholders in the 
national media system. All local teams were asked to nominate specialists with substantial 
knowledge and experience in the field of media, who have a good reputation in their professional 
community. The group of national experts was supposed to consist of experts from various 
fields, namely: 
● 2 Academic/NGO researchers on social/political/cultural issues that are related to the media;  
● 1 Academic/NGO researcher in media law and/or economics; 
● 1 Representative of the media regulators; 
● 1 Representative of a journalists’ organisation; 
● 1 Representative of a publishers’ organisation; 
● 1 Representative of a broadcasters’ organisation. 
The aim of this specific composition of the group of experts was to ensure that all of the 
relevant stakeholders were represented, and their views taken into account. 
Following the nomination, the CMPF team looked at the experts’ profiles to ensure that there 
were no conflicts of interest and that the experts had sufficient expertise to participate in the 
project. Once the group of experts for a particular country was defined and confirmed, experts 
were given access to the MPM2015 platform and the questions that they were supposed to 
evaluate. These questions, and the local teams’ answers to them, were previously checked by the 
CMPF team and were revised in collaboration with the local team if there were a need for this. 
Hence, the answers to the questions that were subjected to the experts’ evaluations were as 
complete as possible and they were motivated by comments and sources before the experts were 
given access to them.  
Once they were granted access, the experts were asked for confirmation of the accuracy of 
the country team’s evaluation. Each member of the group of experts recorded their agreement or 
disagreement with the scoring on the MPM platform, or, alternatively, they had the option to 
declare that a specific question did not fall within his/her field of expertise. In a case when an 
expert disagreed with the scoring, they needed to provide a short written explanation and a 
suggestion for an alternative score on the platform. Once experts had finished their evaluations, 
the country teams were asked to review the feedback of each member of the group of experts 
and to take their views into account when providing the final answer to the questions that had 
been subjected to expert evaluation. Country teams did not necessarily need to change their 
answers if any of the experts disagreed with their initial answer, but if this were the case, they 
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were asked to explain why they had decided to keep their original answer and to address, in a 
comment to the final answer, any disagreement that was expressed by the experts involved.  
Although the procedure described above ensured that this part of the methodology was 
applied to all countries’ data in a standardised and consistent way, which increased the 
comparability of the findings and the robustness of the method, several challenges were faced in 
its implementation. In the first place, a problem was detected in regard to nominations in small 
countries, in which some of the organisations whose representatives were sought did not exist, 
or where there is limited availability. For example, there were difficulties in nominating 
representatives of all of the stakeholders in countries such as Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg. In 
such cases, exceptions were made, and their group of experts consisted of fewer than seven 
representatives. Additionally, another challenge which was faced was in ensuring the nominated 
experts’ participation. Given that the Monitor’s language is English, some experts faced language 
barriers, while some others weren’t able to participate due to time constraints and previous 
engagements. Due to the time constraints of the project, the decision was made that the group of 
experts’ procedure was considered finished, either by the fact that all of the nominated experts 
had participated, or that each question has been evaluated by more than half of all experts (i.e., 
four of seven) by the time that the data collection had to close in order that the project meet its 
deadlines.  
The group of experts, both as a method and as an activity involving stakeholders, proved to 
be of great value to the project. From the methodological perspective, this procedure ensured 
higher reliability and the validity of answers to particularly sensitive and/or difficult to measure 
questions. Experts also contributed to data collection by providing alternative information and 
sources, which the country teams might not have initially taken into account. Finally, by 
employing this procedure, it was ensured that a range of opinions from the most relevant 
stakeholders within a media system were acknowledged and made known. The group of experts’ 
procedure was also beneficial to the project as an activity through which relevant stakeholders 
were not only informed about the project, but were also able to be actively engaged in it, and 
were asked to share their views and opinions.  
In conclusion, there are several lessons which can be drawn from the MPM2015 data 
collection. In the first place, the data collection showed that most primary (e.g., legal documents) 
and secondary (e.g., academic research, NGO reports) data that relate to media pluralism and 
freedom are available across the EU Member States and can be used for comparative analysis. 
However, the MPM2015 implementation also revealed that certain important datasets are 
missing, and these are, in particular, related to economic data. For example, media market 
shares/revenues, and the shares of state advertising within a medium’s advertising markets, are 
data which are either not available or are inaccessible in several of the countries studied. This 
points to the fact that there may be a need for action at either the national or the EU level, which 
would lead to the collection and analysis of these datasets, and so enable a more accurate 
assessment of the risks for media pluralism in Europe.  
In addition, following the two pilot-test implementations, it was established that the 
questionnaire-based method is well suited for large, cross-national comparative research. This 
method has also been found to lead to more accurate and reliable findings if it is triangulated 
with other methods. Conducting interviews with knowledgeable experts, or with institutions’ 
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representatives, was identified as being good practice in answering the questions from the 
questionnaire for which there were no available, or reliable, secondary data. The ‘group of 
experts’ procedure proved to be essential in validating difficult to measure questions and/or 
those which may be particularly sensitive to subjective evaluations. Overall, the multi-method 
approach that was applied by the MPM2015 was found to increase the validity of the findings 




The two pilot-test implementations have already identified some missing datasets, i.e., it was 
revealed that certain information which is relevant in assessing the threats to media pluralism 
across the EU Member States is neither available nor accessible in some, or all, of the countries. 
Specifically, according to the MPM2015, only in four of the 19 EU Member States examined 
does the public know who effectively owns the media, i.e., all of the media owners are publicly 
known. This points to a fundamental problem, since without the information about who owns 
the media, it is challenging to understand potential biases in media content, and also to evaluate 
risks that may stem from media concentration. In addition, the implementation of MPM2015 has 
also revealed that only in six of the 19 countries in the sample is the information about the 
political affiliation of media owners publicly available and transparent. Again, without this 
information it is difficult for the public to understand the biases in media content, to evaluate the 
eventual interests behind the causes which the media advocate, and it is also challenging to assess 
the risks for media pluralism that may stem from the excessive politicisation of the media system, 
where the information about the extent of this politicisation is neither available nor accessible. 
Assessing risks from media concentration has proven to be challenging, and this is also due to 
the fact that, for many EU Member States, there is no accessible information about the media’s 
market shares and revenues. In particular, this information was unobtainable in eight countries in 
relation to the audiovisual sector; nine countries in relation to the radio market, 10 for the print 
market, and, finally, information about the market shares of internet content providers was 
found to be missing in 16 of the 19 countries that were studied through MPM2015. Given that, 
in almost all of the countries, there was data about the media’s audience shares, the fact that the 
information about the media’s market shares is missing may not be so problematic, but it does, 
nonetheless, point to the fact that there is little publicly and widely known about the media’s 
revenues in the EU Member States.  
As can be observed from the MPM2015’s findings, mentioned above, the most problematic 
media sector for assessing the risks for media pluralism is the digital media sector. Not only 
because, in the majority of countries, the data about online content providers’ revenues is not 
available/accessible, but also it is very difficult at the moment, and probably impossible, to 
examine the audience shares of online content providers at a national level in a comparable 
manner, and to assess the degree to which this media market is concentrated within the national 
context. The second pilot-test implementation of the MPM, and the discussions with the 
stakeholders and private enterprises that specialise in analysing online audiences, have revealed 
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that not only is this kind of information presently not being collected by any institution or 
company, but also that there are no best practices in relation to how to gather this type of 
information across the EU countries, nor are there attempts to collect it.  
Finally, another piece of information which is relevant in assessing the threats to media 
pluralism, and which was found to be missing in most of the countries analysed, is the data about 
the shares of state advertising within the media advertising markets. In other words, MPM2015 
has revealed that it is only rare countries that have data about the importance of state advertising 
for the television, radio and print advertising markets, since data for all, or some, advertising 
markets was found to be missing in 14 of 19 countries studied. Of course, this does not 
necessarily mean that the state is trying to hide this information, and/or that it is using state 
advertising to channel funds to particular media outlets, but it does create a situation in which 
the distribution of state advertising is not transparent, and this mechanism for exerting pressure 
over commercial media is more prone to manipulation and misuse.  
Given that the MPM2015 has revealed the significance of these missing datasets, it is deemed 
important that an effort is made for the data that is relevant in assessing the threats to media 
pluralism be collected on a national and/or international level.  
Furthermore, it would also be beneficial if there were better and stronger co-operation among 
the national regulatory authorities of the EU Member States, since, in this way, it might be 
possible to standardise the type of data that is collected, and the methods of their measurement. 
In this regard, the establishment of ERGA sounds very promising. National institutions may be 
able to exchange best practices for data collection, particularly in situations where data are 
challenging to obtain (e.g., data about media’s political affiliation). Better co-operation and 
communication among these institutions could also lead to the exchange of best practices 
relating to how the legal provisions that aim to safeguard media pluralism, and those that are 
related to dealing with infringements can be effectively implemented.  
Finally, particular emphasis, in the coming years, should be given to collecting data that is 
related to pluralism in the digital world, and the analysis of this data, with an aim of 
understanding better how the lack of pluralism online is manifested, and what kind of risks stem 
from the lack of pluralism in the digital world. Certain attempts have been made to gather data 
about online audiences and online content providers, but one of the first obstacles in comparing 
diverse datasets is at the definitional level, since there is no consensus among academics, nor in 
the industry, about how online content providers should be defined, about who counts as an 
online content aggregator, and about how the provision of news on social networks should be 
taken into account and analysed. In this sense, more discussions at the international level are 
needed that aim to reach a working consensus which would allow the collection of the relevant 
data and their analysis. Furthermore, the assessment of online pluralism could benefit from 
better co-operation with both media outlets and businesses that are specialised in analysing 
online audiences (e.g., Alexa, comScore). For example, by co-operating with companies that 
gather data about online traffic and audiences, it is possible to examine the existing methods for 
the analysis of online pluralism, and perhaps to develop alternative methods for online data 
analysis which would produce comparable national datasets based on a consistent understanding 
of the key terms and actors.  
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3. Beyond MPM2015 
Following the two pilot-test implementations of the Media Pluralism Monitor (in 2014 and 
2015), and particularly based on the experiences of the MPM2015 implementation and the 
lessons learned from it, in 2016 a new Media Pluralism Monitor will be developed and it will be 
applied in 28 European Countries and two Candidate ones (Montenegro and Turkey)1 
(MPM2016). Improvements will be made, both to the tool (the questionnaire) and to the method 
of its implementation, in order for this research instrument to be able to detect the threats to 
media pluralism across the EU Member States in a comparable manner, while still capturing the 
specific characteristics of national media systems, and to do so within tight deadlines.  
The final research instrument will rely heavily on the MPM2015, but it will include minor 
modifications that are based on: 
● the evaluation of the tool after its second pilot-test implementation  
● results based on the data collection in the 19 countries,  
● new developments in the field of media, 
● newly available data.  
The modifications will take into account, for instance, the new issues that have been added to 
the indicators on media literacy and on access to the media by people with disabilities, in order to 
better capture the current risks for media pluralism. In addition, where results have shown that 
the data are not available across the EU, for reasons other than transparency, the variables are 
suspended, and, in cases where new measures for monitoring the digital media have been 
identified and data made available, new questions addressing these issues will be added.  
Particular focus on the refinement of the MPM2015 and the development of the next 
research instrument, will again be put on the improvement in the balance between questions, 
thus aiming to assess the legal framework, and those aiming to assess actual practices. The first 
attempts at this had already been made in the fine-tuning of the MPM2014, but the second pilot-
test implementation has shown that more needs to be done in this regard. Moreover, significant 
effort is being put into further streamlining the tool, in the sense that more symmetry is being 
developed among the indicators and domains during the process of refinement.  
The simultaneous application of the MPM tool in all of the Member States will promote and 
facilitate the development of more informed comparative academic studies, and novel research 
on the themes of pluralism and media freedom in the EU. At the same time, the comparative 
validity of the tool and its widespread application to all Member States will allow best practice 
cases to emerge and will call attention to situations that point to a major risk and that may call 
for a deepening of the analysis, or even for specific policy interventions. 
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